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I
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade,  a  new picture of the antitrust  landscape  has begun to
emerge.  The dominant emphasis of the ever more popular view concerns the
ascendance  of  economics  in  antitrust  decisionmaking  and  doctrine,
particularly  in Supreme  Court  adjudication, which  is  leading the  way for  the
lower courts.'  Moreover,  it is  not just economic  analysis in  the abstract that
supposedly  has  come  to  the forefront but  the strand of economic  argument
associated  with  the  Chicago  School. 2  The  new  insight  thought  to  be
contained  in  this  brand of economic  analysis  is  allegedly  responsible for  the
doctrinal  shifts that generally  have narrowed  the scope  of antitrust  liability.
This  perceived  trend  has  become  all  the  more  salient  with  the
appointment  to the federal  courts  of appeals  of the  three leading  academic
proponents  of this "new  learning"-Richard  Posner, Robert Bork, and Frank
Easterbrook. 3  It is not the case, however, that these appointments  are seen as
central  to  the movement  in  doctrine,  which  is  thought  to  be most  strongly
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1.  This article  will not  directly  address  the  similar perceived  trend  concerning  the antitrust
enforcement  agencies-the  Department  of Justice  and  FTC-although  much  of  the  analysis
presented  here  would  be  applicable.  Eleanor  Fox's  discussion of former  FTC  Chairman  Miller
advances similar arguments concerning the role of economics and politics in deciding cases.  See Fox,
Chairman Miller,  the  Federal Trade Commission,  Economics  and Rashomon,  LAW  &  CONTEMP.  PROBS.,
Autumn  1987,  at 36-40,  54-55.
2.  See,  e.g.,  Gerhart,  The  Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis:  The (Near)  Triumph of the Chicago
School,  1982  Sup.  CT.  REV.  319;  Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,  127  U.  PA.  L.  REv. 925
(1979).
3.  The most  well-known and representative  works include R.  BORK,  THE  ANTIrrRUST  PARADOX
(1978);  R.  POSNER,  ANTITRUST  LAw  (1976);  R.  POSNER  & F.  EASTERBROOK,  ANITUST  (2d ed.  1981).
Each  has  also written  numerous  articles  on  antitrust, some  of which will be discussed later in this
article.
For  the most part,  this article will not directly discuss the  opinions of these and other recendy-
appointed "law  and economics" judges.  As  yet, all but Posner have not rendered a large number of
antitrust decisions, and  the  group of cases  as  a  whole has been  sufficiently straightforward  that it
provides  little basis  for assessing  the  likelihood  that  these  appointments  will  have  a  unique  and
profound affect on the future course of antitrust law.  Instead,  this article will focus on the Supreme
Court-the locus  of most of the  important  developments-and  on  the commentary,  of which  the
writings of these judges constitute a significant segment.  At least in the antitrust context, the implicit
assumption  of this session  of the  conference and  much  of the rest,  which  suggests  the  merits  of
focusing on the economic analysis of  a handful of recently-appointed judges, is belied by conclusions
presented here to the effect that observed changes are largely inexplicable in terms of the applicationLAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
indicated by the Supreme Court's General Dynamics4 and Sylvania5 decisions in
the mid-1970's.  Rather,  additional  lower  court judges  of high  visibility who
are favorable  to the movement are predicted to have an important influence in
consolidating the Chicago law and economics revolution in antitrust doctrine.
The story just described is rather puzzling.  Although frequent reference is
made  to  the  contrast  between  contemporary  Supreme  Court  antitrust
jurisprudence and that of the more interventionist Warren Court, little note is
made of the parallel shifts in the direction taken by the Supreme Court in such
areas  as  criminal procedure,  the  first  amendment,  enforcement  of the  civil
rights  and  voting acts,  and  numerous  other  areas  of law.  In light  of these
simultaneous  developments  by  the  same  Court-and  typically  the  same
Justices-that  are  so  well-known  and  frequently  discussed,  it  is  remarkable
that  commentary  concerning  doctrinal  changes  in  antitrust  is  inclined  to
attribute the  most  recent swing  in the antitrust  pendulum  to  new  economic
insight rather  than to larger  political currents. 6
Simply observing this broader context-which  is virtually never to be seen
even  in  the  footnotes  of  most  recent  commentary  concerning  these
developments  in  antitrust-is  sufficient  to  cast  serious  doubt  on  the
explanation  based  on  the  Supreme  Court's  recent  learning  of economics,
Chicago style.7  Nor can  the simple story be rescued through a broader claim
suggesting that the law and economics  perspective  generally was responsible
for all  the  recent  shifts  in  Burger  Court jurisprudence.  Although  law  and
economics has  been applied  to virtually all areas of law, 8 and although  some
parallel developments  do reflect more of an economic approach, 9 it would be
of more sophisticated economic  analysis and instead largely reflect more general shifts in politics and
ideology.
4.  United  States v. General  Dynamics  Corp.,  415 U.S.  486 (1974).
5.  Continental  T.V.,  Inc.  v.  GTE Sylvania,  Inc.,  433  U.S.  36  (1977).
6.  Most  examinations  of the  Burger  Court's  shift  in  antitrust  doctrine  make  no mention  of
related shifts in other doctrines,  analyzing  the Court's views on antitrust  as though the subject were
sui generis.  See, e.g.,  Markovits,  The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic Analysis, in THE BURGER  COURT
180  (V.  Blasi  ed.  1983);  Sullivan,  The Economic Jurisprudence  of The Burger Court's Antitrust Policy:  The
First Thirteen  Years,  58  NOTRE  DAME  L.  REV.  1 (1982).
7.  The  interpretation  presented  in  the  text  is  not  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  Court's  using
Chicago School law and economics arguments in its opinions as part of the written rationalization.  It
is  well  known  that  countless  reasons  may  be  offered  in  opinions  to  support  results  reached
(sometimes  unconsciously,  sometimes  not)  on  other  grounds.  See,  e.g.,  J.  FRANK,  LAW  AND  THE
MODERN  MIND  100-04  (1930).  Moreover,  one  would  expect  a  court  to  cite  academic  literature
supporting  a  more  general  shift  in  position,  even  if the  scholarship  itself had  little if  any  direct
influence.  It  also  is not  the  case that the  Burger  Court  was  generally  anxious  to adopt  economic
analysis as  a general matter.  (No substantial evidence yet exists with regard to the Rehnquist Court.)
For  example,  the  majority  in  Allen  v.  Wright,  468  U.S.  737  (1984),  ignored  Justice  Stevens'
application of simple supply and demand analysis in determining causation in a standing inquiry, see
id. at  788-89  & n.6,  instead  choosing  to  characterize  the  connection  as  "indirect"  and  "merely
speculative,"  id.  at  757-58.  Numerous  other  instances  could  be  offered,  all  suggesting  that
interpreting  the Burger Court's jurisprudence  on the assumption  that it has accepted  economics as a
preferred mode of analysis is  a far more problematic approach than one looking to easily identifiable
patterns  in  its  results.  Finally,  later  discussion  in  this  article  will  indicate  that  the  actual  use  of
Chicago  law and economics  in recent  antitrust decisions  is overstated.
8.  See,  e.g.,  R.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  (3d  ed.  1986).
9.  See,  e.g.,  Mathews  v.  Eldridge,  424  U.S.  319,  334-35  (1976)  (cost-benefit formulation  for
determining  what  process  is  due).  More  generally,  Frank  Easterbrook  has  claimed  that  Supreme
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extremely difficult  to make the case that the broad changes in Supreme Court
doctrine are primarily or even substantially explained  by these phenomena.' 0
This  article  indicates  how  the  common  portrayal  of  developments  in
antitrust doctrine is mistaken and misleading.  Part II questions whether there
really  has  been  a  significant  change  in  the  use  of economic  analysis  when
addressing economic issues that arise in antitrust.  Part III casts doubt on the
implicit  assumption  that  significant  changes  in  the  teachings  of economic
analysis  can account for changes  in antitrust doctrine  and perspectives.  Part
IV considers  the  existence and meaning of a  fundamental shift in  the role of
economic  issues  in  deciding antitrust  cases-that  is,  whether  economics  has
officially been deemed the exclusive rather than merely an important objective
of antitrust.  Suggestions  that  the  landscape  has  thus  been  radically  altered
are overstated, although there surely appears to have been some movement in
that direction.  Yet, when  the arguments of the first parts are combined  with
an understanding of the history of the antitrust laws, it becomes clear that the
shift in both doctrine and rationale witnessed in recent years  is fundamentally
a political,  not an  economic,  phenomenon.  As  a  result,  the antitrust picture
blends  rather comfortably  into  the larger  canvas  portraying legal  change  in
the federal courts.
Court Justices  have  generally become  more sophisticated in economic reasoning.  See  Easterbrook,
The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,  98 HARV.  L.  REV.  4  (1984)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Foreword]; Tribe, Constitutional  Calculus: EqualJustice  or Economic Efficiency,  98
HARV.  L.  REV.  592  (1985)  (reply to Easterbrook); Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority:  A Reply,
98  HARV.  L.  REV.  622  (1985)  [hereinafter  Easterbrook,  Reply].  The  first  two  of Easterbrook's
economic  criteria are  most readily  examined.  He claims  that courts  should take  an ex  ante rather
than  an  ex  post  perspective-that  is,  they  should  primarily  consider  the  effect  of their  rules  in
governing  future conduct  rather than focusing on  the equity it  works in  the case at hand-and that
they should apply marginal  analysis rather than considering merely averages.  Easterbrook, Foreword,
supra, at  10-14.
Both of these points  (the first  being more  familiar) have  a  long history.  For example, the  first
amendment chilling effects concept  (often applied in discussing overbreadth  and vagueness)  exhibits
a particularly strong emphasis on an ex ante perspective and  the less restrictive alternatives concept
is an explicit use of marginal analysis.  Likewise, the exclusionary rule has only modest force as an  ex
post  argument  but  has  been  strongly  defended  on  ex  ante  grounds  (and  similarly  for Miranda
warnings  and  many other criminal  procedure requirements).  There  is surely room  for argument-
argument  that  would  be  most  difficult  to  resolve-concerning  the  frequency  with  which  such
"economic"  approaches  have been applied over the decades, but even  if  the trend  has been  toward
increasing use of  such common sense insights that are frequently associated with economics, it seems
hard  to believe  that  these shifts are  primarily responsible for most of the significant movements  in
Supreme  Court  doctrine over the most recent decades.  (Note that Easterbrook does not insist that
his claimed rise in use of the principles he discusses explains the general  changes in doctrine, see, e.g.,
Easterbrook, Foreword,  supra, at 4-5; Easterbrook, Reply, supra, at 622-23  (indicating that  he does not
claim  that "application  of the three  normative principles  leads  to  a determinate  outcome in all  (or
even  most)  cases"),  although  he  does  see  his  pattern  strongly  in antitrust  cases,  see  Easterbrook,
Foreword, supra, at 58-59.)
10.  The  discussion  of  stated  rationale  for  Supreme  Court  antitrust  decisions  in  note  7  is
applicable  to references to economic  reasoning in  other contexts as  well.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
II
HAS  THERE BEEN  A  SIGNIFICANT  CHANGE  IN  THE  DEGREE TO  WHICH
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  IS  USED  TO  ADDRESS  ECONOMIC  ISSUES?
Statements  that  the  new  law  and  economics  has  come  to  dominate  the
Supreme  Court's  antitrust  decisionmaking  typically  encompass  some
combination  of  three  subsidiary  claims:  Economic  analysis  is  used  more
frequently in addressing economic issues; economic analysis has come to yield
different answers  to economic questions; and economic questions  have come
to  be  more  important  in  deciding  antitrust  cases.  These  three  claims  are
discussed,  respectively,  in  parts  II-IV  of  this  article.  The  first  claim
concerning  the  frequency  with  which  economics  is  used  in  addressing
concededly  economic  issues  is  by  far  the  easiest  to  assess  and  yields  the
clearest answer.  If one focuses  on the last five decades-a span that includes
virtually  all  of  the  cases,  many  by  the  Warren  Court,  most  despised  by
Chicago  law  and  economics-it  seems  rather  clear  that  economic  analysis
always  has  played an important  and central  role in antitrust  decisions."I
The  proposition  that  economics  has  long  been  accepted  in  antitrust,
although  contrary to much  of current  commentary,  is  really  quite  familiar.' 2
After all, the most prominent works in the  1950's  took a  decidedly economic
approach, 13  even if one omits the work of the Chicago  School.' 4  It has been
contemplated  for decades,  if not  from the beginning,  that economics  would
play  an  important  role  in  analyzing  antitrust  issues.  In  fact,  the  law  and
economics  movement of the past few decades is often thought of as involving
the application  of economics  to  all aspects  of law except antitrust, regulation,
and  a  few  other fields-those  in  which  the use  of economics  has  long  been
taken  for granted.15
The most notable antitrust opinions over this time period rather uniformly
display  the  application  of economic  analysis,  whatever  one  thinks  of  the
quality  or  content of the  analysis  in  particular  opinions.  Consider  first  the
earlier decades.  In his recent analysis, Frederick Rowe argues that the strong
connection  between economics  and antitrust  doctrine  was established  in  the
11.  The content of that analysis is the subject of part III.  A similar claim could also be made for
much of the first half-century of antitrust jurisprudence, although it is more difficult to analyze given
that economic  analysis  of industry  was  not  nearly  as  developed  at  the  time.  Since  most  current
commentary  focuses  on  the comparison  of the  last  decade or two  with  the immediately  preceding
decades,  this article will largely be  limited in a similar manner.
12.  See,  e.g.,  Hovenkamp,  Antitrust Policy After  Chicago, 84  MICH.  L.  REV.  213, 217-20  (1985).
13.  See, e.g., J.  DIRLAM  & A.  KAHN,  FAIR  COMPETITION:  THE LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  OF  ANTITRUST
POLICY  (1954);  C.  KAYSEN  & D.  TURNER,  ANTITRUST  POLICY  (1959).
14.  See,  e.g.,  Bowman,  Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.  19  (1957);  Director
&  Levi,  Law and the Future:  Trade Regulation, 51  Nw.  U.L.  REV.  281  (1956).
15.  For example,  a  large number  of the recent  texts  on  law  and  economics  do not  even  have
index  entries  for  antitrust,  much  less  any  significant  treatment.  See,  e.g.,  C.  GOETz,  LAW  AND
ECONOMICS  (1984);  H. MANNE,  THE ECONOMICS  OF  LEGAL  RELATIONSHIPS (1975);  A.M.  POLINSKY,  AN
INTRODUCTION  TO  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  (1983).  The primary  exception is  Richard Posner's  Economic
Analysis  of Law, supra note  8,  which  devotes  two  of  twenty-eight  chapters  to  antitrust,  a  hardly
surprising fact  given that one of Posner's  primary fields has long  been antitrust.
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1940's.16  That the heavy use of economics in leading antitrust decisions dates
back at least this far is amply supported by a consideration  of the most salient
cases of the period.  Learned Hand's opinion  in Alcoa '7-- one frequently  and
heavily  criticized  in the new law  and economics  of antitrust,8-is well-known
for  its  extensive  discussion  of market  definition  and  its  relation  to  market
power, one that greatly surpassed most of what had come before (and much of
what  has  come  after) in economic  sophistication. 19  United Shoe,20  another  of
the  leading monopolization  opinions  of the earlier era that has  been  heavily
criticized  by  the new  law and economics  of antitrust,2'  is  particularly  known
for  its  heavy  use  of economic  analysis. 22  The  Supreme  Court's  Cellophane
opinion,23  which  contains  one  of  the  most  prominent  and  extensive
discussions  of market  definition  of the  period,  relies  heavily  on  economic
concepts,  such as the cross-elasticity  of demand. 24  In the merger area, Brown
Shoe 25  is  the  most criticized  opinion.26  Yet it  is  also  known  for reading  the
rather ambiguous  language  of the  1950 amendment  to  the Clayton Act-"in
any  line  of  commerce  in  any  section  of  the  country" 27 -as  referring  to
product  and  geographic  markets  in  the  sense  economists  mean  by  those
terms.28  Although  the  examples  could  be  multiplied, 29  it  suffices  for  the
purposes  of this  argument  to  have  established  the  prevalence  of economic
analysis  in  a  number  of the  most  prominent  opinions  of the  era,  and  in
16.  Rowe,  The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models:  The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics,
72  GEO.  L.J.  1511,  1520-22  (1984);  see also supra note  11  (discussing whether  it might have  begun
even earlier).
17.  United  States v.  Aluminum Co. of Am.,  148 F.2d  416 (2d Cir.  1945).
18.  See,  e.g.,  R.  BORK,  supra note  3,  at 52-52,  165-70  ("Alcoa opinion  . . . stands  revealed  as  a
thoroughly perverse judicial tour de force");  R.  POSNER,  supra note 3,  at  206-07,  214-15.
19.  See  148 F.2d at 424-27.  The claim here is not that Hand's  analysis is beyond criticism based
on  the economic  analysis of the time or that developed since, but  rather that his opinion  reflects  a
serious and  substantial attempt  to apply economics  to antitrust.
20.  United States v.  United Shoe Mach. Corp.,  110  F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.  1953),  aff'd  per curiam,
347 U.S.  521  (1954).
21.  See, e.g.,  R. BORK,  supra note 3, at  138-42,  170-73,  181-82;  R.  PosNER, supra note 3,  at 202-06,
215-16.
22.  Judge Wyzanski  employed  economist  Carl Kaysen  to assist  him in  the case.  See  C.  KAYSEN,
UNITED  STATES  V.  UNITED  SHOE  MACHINERY  CORP.  (1956).
23.  United States  v.  E.I.  Du Pont De  Nemours & Co.,  351  U.S.  377 (1956).
24.  This  opinion,  which  favored  the  defendant,  has  long been  criticized  for  misanalyzing  the
question.  Many commentators have found more persuasive the arguments  in the dissent, which  also
relied heavily on economic  analysis and cited the most relevant  economic literature.  See 351  U.S.  at
414-25  (citing Stocking & Meuller,  The Cellophane Case, 45  AM.  ECON.  REV.  29  (1955)).
25.  Brown  Shoe Co. v.  United States,  370 U.S.  294  (1962).
26.  See, e.g.,  R. BORE,  supra note 3, at 200-08, 210-16;  R.  POSNER,  supra note 3, at  100-05,  129-30.
27.  15  U.S.C.  §18  (1982  & Supp.  III  1985).
28.  See  370 U.S.  at 324,  335; see also United  States v.  Philadephia Nat'l  Bank, 374 U.S.  321,  362-
63  (1963)  (indicating  that  presumptive  approach  is  "fully  consonant  with  economic  theory"  and
relying  heavily  on  economists  and  other  commentators  strongly  influenced  by  economics).  Once
again,  the  claim  in  the  text only concerns  whether  economic  analysis  is employed  in a  substantial
manner,  not the quality of the analysis  or the  conclusions reached.
29.  For  example,  the  much  criticized  case  of Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  United  States  (Standard
Stations),  337 U.S. 293  (1949),  see, e.g.,  R.  BORE,  supra note 3,  at 299-301;  R. POSNER,  supra note 3, at
201-02,  explicitly  used  economic  grounds  to justify  a  more  lenient  treatment  of requirements
contracts  than tying arrangements,  despite identical  statutory language.  See  337 U.S.  at 307-08.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
particular  those now most heavily criticized by the new law and economics  of
antitrust.
Given  this  history,  it  would  be  rather  difficult  to  imagine  that  antitrust
decisions of the most recent fifteen  years could reflect  a substantially  greater
use  of economics  in  addressing  economic  questions  than  was  employed  in
these earlier times.  In fact, the more recent cases best known for signaling the
new  direction  of the  Supreme  Court  exhibit  a  similar  level  of reliance  on
economic analysis.  Although widely heralded as indicating a new direction  for
the Supreme  Court in  the merger  area,30  analysis  of the decision  in General
Dynamics  3 1  reveals surprisingly little change of any kind.  That opinion is most
known  for  looking  beyond  simple  market  share  statistics.  The  Court's
primary  observation  was  that past  market share  was  a poor predictor of the
future  in  this  unique market.  Companies  with  significant  past  sales  of coal,
such as  one  of the merger partners in the case,  might be of little competitive
significance  in  the future  if they were  almost out of reserves.
This  point  hardly  reflects  the  application  of  new  or  particularly
sophisticated  economic  analysis.3 2  Moreover,  the  Court  explicitly  quoted
Brown  Shoe-that  earlier  and  allegedly  anti-economic  analysis  opinion-in
support  of its  claim  that  it  was  appropriate  to  look  beyond  simple  market
share  statistics.3 3  In  addition,  the  reasoning  behind  this  departure  from
market share  statistics  is  rather limited.3 4
Nor did the dissent, consisting of the Warren Court holdovers,3 5 disagree
in  principle  with  the  majority's  willingness  to  move  beyond  market  share
statistics  based  on  past  sales  to  consider  reserves.  Instead  it  argued  that
reserves  should  have  been  considered  at  the  time  of the merger, when  the
now-depleted  company did in fact possess  substantial reserves.  Furthermore,
the  dissent  suggested  that  the company's  deep-mine  reserves,  although  not
currently being mined, should be included because the company had previous
deep-mining experience.3 6  Whatever one thinks of the merits of this dispute,
the dissent's position is hardly one that can be characterized  as opposition  in
principle  to  the application  of economic  analysis.  General Dynamics therefore
involved  no revolution in the use of economics in antitrust decisionmaking.3 7
30.  See,  e.g.,  Baxter,  Reflections upon Professor Williamson's Comments, 27  ST. Louis  U.L.J.  316,  317-
18  (1983).
31.  United  States v. General  Dynamics  Corp.,  415  U.S.  486  (1974).
32.  Not surprisingly, the Court  did not find it necessary  to cite any commentary  by economists
or others influenced  by economics  to motivate or support  its analysis.  The only such citations in  the
majority  opinion  involve  a  passing  reference  to  alternative  rationales  for  the  failing-company
defense.  See id. at  507 n.15.
33.  Id. at 498.
34.  See,  e.g.,  id. at  500.
35.  The dissent was written  by justice Douglas,joined  by justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
The  only  other  remaining  justice  from  the  Warren  Court  was justice  Stewart,  the author  of the
majority opinion,  who had been  a regular dissenter in Warren  Court merger cases.  See, e.g.,  United
States v.  Von's Grocery  Co., 384  U.S. 270,  301  (1966)  ("The sole consistency that I can find  is  that
under  § 7, the Government  always  wins.").
36.  See  415  U.S. at 524-26.
37.  Robert Bork seems to agree with this characterization, and finds it unfortunate.  See R.  BORK,
supra note  3,  at 218.
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The most-cited decision  in discussions of the rise of economics in antitrust
is  Sylvania.38  In  at  least  one  important  sense,  this  case  did  involve  a
substantial departure from the past:  It reversed part of the Court's decision in
Schwinn.39  Much  of the  Court's  criticism  of Schwinn  was  directed  to  its
formalism.  This  criticism  had  been  emphasized  previously  by  numerous
commentators,  who  did  not  base  their arguments  particularly  on  economic
analysis. 40  Of course,  an important  part of the Court's  basis  for permitting
territorial  restrictions  was  economic  arguments  that  had  come  to  receive
wider attention.4'  Such reliance,  however, is hardly a characteristic  unique to
this opinion  or  to antitrust  decisions  generally. 42  Furthermore,  the Court's
acceptance of the economic  arguments  was  limited.43
Some of the other more prominent antitrust opinions of the past decade
reflect the use of economic analysis while others show less evidence. 44  In any
event, it is  clearly not the  case that there has occurred  a fundamental change
in the view of courts concerning whether economic  analysis  provides a useful
and important  source  of wisdom  concerning  antitrust  law.  Economics  was
well  received  by  courts  and  commentators  alike  long  before  the  recent
emergence  of the  new  law and economics  of antitrust.  If changes  are  to be
identified, therefore, it must be either in the content of the economic analysis,
which  is  explored in the next part of this article, or elsewhere.
38.  Continental  T.V.,  Inc. v.  GTE  Sylvania, Inc.,  433  U.S.  36  (1977).
39.  United  States v.  Arnold,  Schwinn  & Co.,  388 U.S.  365 (1967).  Schwinn itself had reversed
the earlier  Warren  Court decision  adopting a  rule of reason approach.  White Motor Co.  v.  United
States, 372 U.S. 253  (1963).  None of the recent commentators  have suggested, however,  that White
Motor demonstrates  that the Warren Court had originally adopted an economic  approach, only later
to be rejected  in Schwinn.
40.  See 433  U.S.  at 47-54  & n.13.
41.  See id. at  54-58.
42.  William  Baxter argues that  "the  insight that not all forms of rivalry are beneficial"  is  clearly
one that "the Court had never previously had."  Baxter, supra note 30, at  318.  This interpretation  is
rather surprising.  After  all,  the  rule  of reason  adopted  in  Sylvania was  that  from  Chicago Board of
Trade, see 433 U.S. at 49 n. 15,  a case  that six decades earlier  upheld (rightly or wrongly) restraints  on
rivalry as  beneficial  to competition.  And the Court's  earlier application  of the  rule of reason  in  this
context in  White Motor Co.,  372  U.S.  at  261-62  (quoting the  same passage  from  Chicago Board), was
premised  on  this  possibility.  One  could  also  note  the  cases  upholding  restrictive  practices  by
patentees,  and  many others.  Interestingly,  in  an earlier  statement  defending  the  proposition  that
"consumer  welfare"  should be the sole goal of antitrust, Baxter  explicitly argued that the Supreme
Court  in  the  1890's  recognized  that  there existed  "categories  of agreements  which  did  eliminate
rivalry  but nevertheless  were permissible  under the [Sherman]  Act."  Baxter, Placing the Burger Court
in Perspective, 47 ANTITRUST  L.J.  803,  804  (1978)  (footnote omitted).
43.  See,  e.g.,  Markovits,  supra note  6,  at  191  (noting  three  respects  in  which  the  economic
argument was  not followed,  but seeing the  opinion  as  "a  significant  step in  the right direction").
44.  Frank Easterbrook purports to offer a long list of recent Supreme Court  decisions that have
been  strongly  influenced  by  the  Chicago  School  efficiency  approach.  See  Easterbrook,  Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84  MicH.  L.  REV.  1696,  1698  n.7  (1986).  Yet  virtually  none  of the cases  he  cites
contain  any significant economic  analysis or reflect any  significant  change in  approach.  Many cited
portions explicitly  rely on cases and principles  long criticized by the Chicago  School.  And a few-in
the  portions  he cites--explicitly  refuse  to take  approaches  he advocates,  in  one  case  (NCAA)  quite
directly, in  that both the method  and result he personally presented  to the Court  were rejected.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
III
HAS  THERE  BEEN  A  SIGNIFICANT  CHANGE  IN  WHAT  ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS  SAYS  ABOUT  THE  ECONOMIC  ISSUES  IN
ANTITRUST  CASES?
The question whether  there has been  a  substantial increase  in the use of
economics  to analyze  economic  questions  could  be answered  simply and  in
the negative.  The question addressed  in this  part of the article,  concerning
the content of the economic analysis,  is  more complex.  Section A  describes
how there have been a number of changes  in the methodology  and content of
the  relevant  economic  analysis  over the  past  four  decades.  These  changes,
however,  do  not  correspond  to  those  frequently  discussed  by  the  Chicago
School,  and  often  run  in  precisely  the  opposite  direction.  Moreover,  the
current  content  of  economic  analysis  hardly  provides  the  unquestionable
support  that  is  often  claimed  for  many  of the  Chicago  School  positions.
Section  B  demonstrates  the  lack  of any  direct,  strong  connection  between
economic  theory  per  se  and  the  positions  generally  associated  with  the
economic approach.  This section explores both the methods used to examine
markets  and restrictive  practices  and those used  to formulate  legal  rules (for
example,  the  preference  for  the  rule  of reason).  Lest  the  argument  be
misunderstood,  the analysis presented here is  not intended to be a  thorough
critique of Chicago School economics;  many of its teachings are useful, and it
is  beyond  the scope  of this  brief investigation  to  address  thoroughly  those
that are not.
45
A.  Changes  in  Economists'  Analyses
At one level, the claim that there has  been a significant change  in antitrust
scholars'  economic  analyses  of restrictive practices  is  undeniable.  This  shift
can  readily  be  seen  in  the  leverage  context,  which  involves  the  alleged
extension  of  monopoly  power  from  one  market  to  another.  Previous
simplistic  views  concerning  the  possibility  of leverage4 6  have  been  strongly
critiqued  by  the Chicago  School,  often  with  little effective  reply.47  It  seems
fair to  say that, in its  simplest form,  the original leverage  analysis  has largely
45.  For discussion and critique of a number of the Chicago  School positions, see  Hovenkamp,
supra note  12, at 260-83; Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional  Market Power Analysis and  A  Direct Adjustment
Alternative; 95  HARV.  L.  REV.  1817  (1982)  [hereinafter Kaplow,  Market  Power]; Kaplow,  Extension  of
Monopoly  Power  Through  Leverage,  85  COLUM.  L.  REV.  515  (1985)  [hereinafter  Kaplow,  Leverage];
Kaplow,  The  Patent-Antitrust  Intersection:  A  Reappraisal, 97  HARV.  L.  REV.  1813  (1984);  Scherer,  The
Posnerian Harvest:  Separating Wheat from  Chaff (Book  Review),  86  YALE  L.J.  974  (1977);  Williamson,
Antitrust Enforcement:  Where It's Been,  Where  It's Going, 27  ST.  Louis U.LJ.  289  (1983).  It  should  be
noted, however,  that the cited critiques, although disagreeing with various aspects of Chicago School
arguments, often are equally critical of many of the positions taken  by those targeted by the Chicago
School's attacks.
46.  See,  e.g.,  Kaplow,  Leverage,  supra  note  45,  at  516-17  (discussing  and  documenting  the
prevalence of the traditional view on leverage).
47.  See,  e.g.,  id. at 517-20 (reviewing  the critique).
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vanished.  Although  the  Chicago  School  position  has  been  the  subject  of
much  criticism,  the debate has hardly  been resolved.
48
More  generally,  despite  the  new  law  and  economics  criticism  of many
traditional views, it is not the case that the Chicago  School of antitrust simply
reflects  application  of the  best  and  most  current  economic  wisdom  to  the
economic  questions  posed  by antitrust  law.  Quite  the contrary,  the  "price
theory" widely  hailed by the Chicago  School as its heart and soul, 49  although
a  useful  starting point,  is  in fact  the  earliest and  simplest form  of economic
analysis  of  industry.50  Much  of the  Chicago  School  commentary  fails  to
appreciate  that  divergent  work  by  economists  was  a  response  to  the
shortcomings of the simple price theory that Chicagoans hawk in competition
with  these other economic approaches.
5'
One  dimension  of the  change  in  economic  analysis  concerns  the  work,
which  began in  the  1930's and reached  its peak  in the  1950's,  that involved
the intensive study of particular industries  ("case studies") for the purpose of
gaining  additional  insight into  their  operation.52  Richard  Posner  has  noted
the difference between these two approaches and has criticized the case study
method  for  being  atheoretical. 53  Yet  case  studies  were  not  in  line  with
existing theory precisely because  it was suspected,  and then discovered,  that
existing theory  was itself not in line with reality.  Because the  general view  of
the  Chicago  School  of economics,  best  exemplified  in  Milton  Friedman's
famous methodological  article on the subject,  is that theory is to be judged by
its predictive  power,54  one would think that the less rigorous ad hoc theories
of those involved  in performing case  studies would be applauded because  of
the better match with reality.  Such has not been  the case.  More importantly,
this criticism of case studies misses  the mark.  Part of the  goal of case studies
has  always  been  to learn  from them in order  to generate better theory.  The
complexity and variety of industry has often frustrated those hopes, but that is
hardly  a  ground  for  criticizing  the  effort  or  for  casting  aside  the  valuable
lessons  gleaned  from such endeavors.
Another  important defect exists  in the  Chicago School's attempts  to cling
to  simple  price  theory  as  offering  the  best  insights  for  the  new  law  and
48.  See, e.g.,  id. at  520-26 (criticizing Chicago School economics arguments  concerning leverage
and citing criticism offered  by many others).
49.  See, e.g.,  R.  BORK,  supra note  3,  at  116-33;  Posner, supra note 2,  at 928-29.
50.  See, e.g.,  Rowe, supra note  16,  at  1547.  Robert Bork's view on this point appears  to be much
the same, see Bork, inJudicial  Precedent and the New  Economics, in CHANGING ANTITRUST  STANDARDS  5,  5-
6 (Conf. Bd.  Research  Bull. No.  144,  1983),  although  he  later refers  to  the  economic approach  he
advocates as "really  an intellectual revolution in the academic world,"  id. at  I1.  But see Breyer, in id.
at  6,  11  (denying  revolution;  noting that  such  arguments  on  resale  price  maintenance  have  been
around  for  twenty  years);  Fox,  supra note  1, at  43  (describing  change  in  FTC  decisionmaking  in
Reagan Administration:  "Economic  arguments  compatible with  less  government  (while known  for
many  years) began  to command  respect.").
51.  See,  e.g.,  Schmalensee,  The  New  Industrial Organization and  the  Economic Analysis  of Modern
Markets,  in ADVANCES  IN  ECONOMIC  THEORY 253,  253-55  (1982).
52.  See, e.g.,  id.
53.  See Posner, supra note 2,  at 931.
54.  See  Friedman,  The  Methodology  of Positive  Economics,  in  M.  FRIEDMAN,  ESSAYS  IN  POSITIVE
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economics  of antitrust.  Theoretical  advances  in microeconomics  during  the
1970's and  1980's have greatly surpassed the simple price theory formulated
in the  1890's to provide an understanding of industrial practices. 55  Much  of
this work, to be discussed in greater detail in section B, emphasizes  the need
for dynamic rather than static analysis, as well as the need to factor in the free-
rider problem when assessing strategic behavior.  These recent  advances also
recognize  the necessity of considering  the implications  of a variety of market
imperfections  that,  while  known  for  some  time,  have  only  recently  been
analyzed  in  sufficient  depth  to  permit  a  greater  understanding  of  their
implications.
There have indeed been substantial changes in the methodology employed
by  economists  studying industrial  organization  in  the past  decades,  and  the
new  learning  of  economists  has  substantial  bearing  on  the  appropriate
content of antitrust  doctrine.  Some  of this understanding  favors  the  results
advocated  by  the  Chicago  School,  some  is  in  opposition,  and  much  is  too
tentative to permit confident conclusions at present.  It is clearly not the case,
however,  that  the  methods  and  conclusions  of  the  "new  economics  of
antitrust,"  as embodied  in  the writings  of the Chicago  School,  simply reflect
what is  new in  economic analysis  that has  a bearing  on antitrust.
Against  this  background,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  briefly  Richard
Posner's  1979  proclamation  that  the competing  schools  of antitrust analysis
had  largely  converged--essentially  establishing  a  near  consensus  on  a
moderate  Chicago  School stance:
I  shall argue  in this paper that although  there was  a time when  the "Chicago"  school
stood for  a  distinctive  approach to  antitrust policy,  especially  in regard  to  economic
questions,  and  when  other  schools,  particularly  a  "Harvard"  school,  could  be
discerned  and contrasted  with  it,  the distinctions  between  these schools  have greatly
55.  See,  e.g.,  Nelson,  Comments  on  a Paper by  Posner, 127  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  949,  949,  952  (1979);
Schmalensee,  supra note  51,  at  255-57.  In  a  footnote  to  his  article  that  is  followed  by  Nelson's
comments, Posner sharply  criticizes  Nelson's argument  in  a rather  surprising  manner.  See  Posner,
supra note  2,  at 948  n.69.  First, Nelson  is castigated  for not being  a careful  reader of the relevant
economics literature.  The claim is a bit  surprising given that Nelson  is  a prominent  economist  and
has himself written in  the field.  Similarly,  Mike  Scherer,  one  of the leading  industrial  organization
economists,  in  reviewing  Posner's  book  on antitrust,  has  noted  Posner's  failure  to  cite  any  of the
relevant economics  literature  that cuts  against many  of his positions.  See Scherer, supra note 45,  at
976 n.12 (connection  between  market structure  and innovation),  986-88  (efficiency  motivations  for
mergers),  990  (scale economies  in  merger context),  991  n.91  (dynamic theory).
Posner  then  defends  himself  on  the  claim  that  the  Chicago  School  ignores  uncertainty,
information,  and  search  costs  by  noting  that  two Chicago  economists  played  important  formative
roles  in  economic  developments  on  these  fronts.  Although  Posner's  point  is  accurate,  Nelson's
criticism  presumably  was not that no one on  premises at  the University  of Chicago ever considered
such  issues  but  rather  that  the  analysis  of Chicago  School  antitrust  analysts  has  systematically
ignored or underplayed  such issues.  On that point, there is  much truth in Nelson's  claim.  See,  e.g.,
Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45,  at 527-39;  Williamson, supra note 45,  at  298-312.
Finally,  Posner emphasizes  that Nelson  does not  state that  the new  literature supports different
policy conclusions than those suggested by the Chicago School.  On this ground, it is  accurate  to say
that  Nelson's  four-page  comment  does  not articulate  and defend  an alternative  antitrust  program.
Moreover, much of the more recent literature,  like much academic  literature,  is  theoretical and  not
explicitly geared  to particular proposals  and doctrines.  It is rather obvious,  however,  that much of
the  recent  work  of economists  casts  doubt  on  the  Chicago  School's  conclusions,  as  many  of the
sources cited  in  this article  attest.
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diminished.  This  has occurred  largely  as a result  of the maturing of economics  as  a
social  science,  and,  as  a  corollary  thereto,  the  waning  of  the  sort  of  industrial
organization  that provided the intellectual foundations  of the Harvard school. 56
Moreover,  any  differences  that remained  he  deemed  "technical  rather  than
ideological."-57  This general  claim,  which  he  explains  as  resulting  from  the
abandonment of economic methodologies  that diverged  from price theory, is
difficult to reconcile  with both the past and current work by economists  in the
field.  Posner does not, however, support his claim by referring  to the work of
industrial  organization  economists.  Rather,  he  notes  that,  contrary  to  the
state of affairs  in the  1950's,  the positions advanced  in antitrust  commentary
by the leading scholars addressing a legal audience  today are often very close
to  Chicago  school  positions. 58  In addition,  he  does not  cite  a broad  cross-
section of current literature, virtually ignoring those who disagree with him.59
Much  more  recently,  however,  Posner  appears  to  have  adopted  a  far
different  outlook.  His new description  portrays "three  warring  camps,"  one
explicitly  divided  from  the  others  on  social  and  political  grounds-which
would appear to retract the claim of no ideological differences-and  the other
two divided into competing economic camps-"a  'Harvard  School,'  prone to
find monopolistic  practices,  and  a 'Chicago  School,'  which  believes  the same
practices  to be for the most part procompetitive." 60  Moreover,  he states  the
belief that  these differences  reflect  "deep  and  at  the moment  unbridgeable
divisions  in  ethical,  political,  and  economic  thought." 6'  These  statements
fairly describe the range of differences in antitrust today, including differences
in  how  economic  analysis  is  applied  and  what  conclusions  are  thereby
reached.  The  following  section  sketches  some  of the primary  differences  in
economic approaches and how they relate to the antitrust doctrines advocated
by  different groups.
B.  Changes  in Views  of Antitrust Reflected  in  the New  Law and
Economics
The Chicago  School  of antitrust has  advanced  the  position  that  belief in
rigorous  economic  analysis  is  associated  with  their particular  views  toward
56.  Posner, supra note 2, at 925.
57.  Id.  at 948.
58.  A large portion of all  the references  contrast  the positions  in the  Kaysen and Turner book
from  1959,  see  C.  KAYSEN  &  D.  TURNER,  supra note  13,  to  those  in  the  then-recently  published
volumes of Areeda and Turner's treatise,  P. AREEDA  & D. TURNER,  ANTITRUST  LAw  (1978).  Although
one  could  argue  about  the  degree  to  which  the  Areeda  and  Turner  treatise  agrees  with  Chicago
School  positions,  that question is not central  to the issue explored  in  text.
59.  For example, the then-recent  treatise by Sullivan is  not cited.  See L. SULLIVAN,  HANDBOOK  OF
THE  LAW  OF  ANTITRUST  (1977).  In addition,  one  would  have  thought  that an  author whose recent
book, see R. POSNER,  supra note 3,  had received a review by  a prominent figure who disagreed strongly
with  a large portion of his major claims, see Scherer, supra note 45, would  be most reluctant  to claim
that  the  school with  which  he  was associated  had  achieved  consensus,  even  if he  had  strong
justifications  for disagreeing  with  such a  review.
60.  R.  POSNER,  THE FEDERAL  COURTS  151-52  (1985).  He cites his article on the Chicago School
for  a description of the two  camps, id.  at  152  n.34, but makes  no mention of the claim contained  in
that article  to the effect  that the separation  between  the camps  had  largely vanished.
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antitrust.  They  offer  opinions  concerning  the general  operation  of markets
and the effects of particular restrictive practices.  In addition, the new law and
economics  of  antitrust  is  associated  with  certain  preferences  concerning
procedural rules and  presumptions,  most notably  the general  preference for
the  rule  of reason.  The  following  two  subsections  consider  whether  the
advocated  positions  on  antitrust  doctrine  can  best  be understood  simply  as
following  from  the  application  of economic  analysis  or  instead  as  deriving
from particular  inclinations  of those associated with  the Chicago School.
1.  Analysis  of  Markets  and  Practices.  The  Chicago  School  of  antitrust
generally  believes  that  markets  are  largely  self-correcting.  Restrictive
practices  thus  can  be  presumed  to  produce  efficiencies  rather  than
anticompetitive  effects. 62   Frank  Easterbrook  has  claimed  that  "[t]he
fundamental premise of antitrust is  the ability of competitive markets  to drive
firms  toward  efficient  operation.  The entire  corpus  of antitrust  doctrine  is
based  on  the  belief  that  markets  do  better  than  judges  or  regulators  in
rewarding  practices  that  create  economic  benefit  and  penalizing  others." 63
But  if this  were  the  fundamental  premise,  there  would  be  no  antitrust  law.
Antitrust  law  is  necessarily  based on  the  contrary  assumption  that  courts  at
times  can  punish  detrimental  practices  better than markets  will.  As  a result,
the tendency  of the  Chicago  School  to  assume  perfect  markets 64  when  this
may  not  be  the  case  suggests  that  their  economic  analysis-even  though
rigorous  and  accurate  in itself-is  not  always  that  most  appropriate  to  the
task.65  One  of  the  most  widely-noted  shortcomings  of  Chicago  School
antitrust analysis is that it uses static models even  when examining  effects that
are  intrinsically  dynamic-as  in  the case of all  exclusionary  practices  that are
alleged  to affect  market  power over time.66
Problems with  the Chicago  School analysis  can  be illustrated by its  heavy
reliance on the survivorship concept-the idea that only efficient practices will
survive  in  competitive  markets. 67  Although  it  is  not  possible  to  offer  a
complete  discussion  here, a  few  general  criticisms  should  suffice  to  indicate
the shortcomings of the  approach.  First, and  most fundamentally,  because it
assumes that only efficient  practices  would survive,  the approach largely begs
62.  See, e.g.,  Easterbrook,  The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX.  L. REV.  1 (1984); sources  cited supra note
3;  supra at  190-91  (quoting Posner).
63.  Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at 24  (emphasis  in original),  discussed in Kaplow,  Leverage, supra
note 45, at  556 n.149.
64.  The  point  is  not  that  literally  perfect  markets  are  assumed,  but  rather  that  substantial
imperfections  are often overlooked  or given little weight.
65.  See, e.g.,  Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45,  at 536-39;  Williamson, supra note 45, at  298-312.
66.  See,  e.g.,  Hovenkamp,  supra note  12,  at  264-74;  Kaplow,  supra note 45,  at  523-25,  527-31;
Markovits,  The Limits  to Simplifying Antitrust:  A  Reply  to  Professor Easterbroook, 63  TEX.  L.  REV.  41,  83
(1984);  Williamson, supra note 45, at 301,  304-06, 309,  311; Williamson, Book Review, 46 U. CHI.  L.
REV.  526,  528 (1979)  (criticizing  Bork).
67.  The  most  explicit  and  thorough  elaboration  of this  view  in  recent  antitrust  literature  is
Easterbrook,  supra note  62.  For  a  general  discussion  of the  natural  selection  model  outside  the
context  of  the  survivorship  of  anticompetitive  practices,  see  F.M.  SCHERER,  INDUSTRIAL  MARKET
STRUCTURE  AND  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  38-40  (2d  ed.  1980);  R.  Hansen  &  W.  Samuelson,  The
Evolution  of Economic  Games (Feb.  1986)  (unpublished  manuscript).
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the question  for antitrust purposes.68  This problem relates  rather directly to
the  previously  noted  tendency  of  the  Chicago  School  to  assume  perfect
markets.  Simply, one must ask why  truly anticompetitive  practices  never can
survive.  Strategic  considerations  combined  with  well-recognized  market
imperfections  make this  query important.69
Second,  the  Chicago  School's  use  of  the  survivorship  concept  often
ignores  or  gives  little weight  to  the  question  of how  long  the evolutionary
process  takes. 70  If one had sufficient  faith in self-correcting  tendencies of the
market,  even  a ban on cartels would  be unnecessary,  although  most Chicago
School  analysts  have  stopped  short of such  a  position.7'  Similar  reasoning
also  implies  that  market  forces  would  tend  to  eliminate  various  forms  of
discrimination  rather  quickly  in  many  contexts.  A  substantial  history,
however,  as well as some current  events, demonstrate  that long time periods
may be necessary  for the process to work. 72  That the problem may be largely
one  of substantial  delay rather  than  a  permanent  lack  of competition  hardly
renders  antitrust unimportant.
73
A third problem  involves  the precision of the selection process as industry
evolves.  When  there  are  many  practices  and  outsiders  have  difficulty
determining  which  are  efficient,  as the Chicago  School would  argue  is  often
the case,  the process  of imitation in  the market will not function as quickly or
68.  See  Rowe, supra note  16, at  1549-50  ("Since nothing succeeds  like success,  that truism yields
neither operational  criteria nor predictive norms,  for its circularities  bless what prevails in the end.").
Robert Bork  surprisingly takes  a  rather similar position  in explaining  the merits of the price theory
approach:  "Microeconomic  theory  rests upon a few empirical  premises....  Once a few such  basic
premises  are  accepted,  the  rest  follows  like  a  proof in  geometry.  The  system  is  entirely  circular,
which  is its  strength  because  circular  logic is not  rebuttable."  Bork, supra note  50,  at  10.  He  is
willing to make this  statement presumably  because he has  utmost confidence in the premises of price
theory, but it is precisely  such premises that have been challenged for decades by economists  moving
beyond  simple price  theory.  See supra section  III-A.
69.  See  sources cited supra note 66.
70.  Final judgments  in antitrust cases  can  also take a very long time,  which must  be taken into
account in  considering  this  issue.  Despite this consideration,  however, antitrust  plays  a significant
role  to  the  extent a large  portion of restrictive  practices  are deterred.  In addition,  in  many  areas
action  will  be  rather  quick, as  in  the  case  of mergers  where  prior  approval  is necessary.  Finally,
considerations of timing are  obviously relevant in  fashioning procedural  rules and  presumptions as
well  as  in  determining the  scope of prohibited practices since  the  former  regulations substantially
affect  the time it takes  to  reach  final judgment  in fully contested  cases.
71.  The OPEC cartel offers a notable example outside the jurisdiction of United States antitrust
law.  Although the cartel has often experienced difficulties and may finally be approaching its demise,
it  is worth  recalling  that over  a decade  ago  many  strong  believers  in  the  market  predicted  that  it
could never stay together long enough to have  any significant effect.  See,  e.g.,  Friedman,  The Economy
and the  1976 Election, NEWSWEEK,  Feb.  17,  1975, at 80  ("[T]he OPEC  oil cartel will break  down....
The only question is how long it will take ....  [T]he chances are good that ...  the cartel will begin to
disintegrate by  1976  and  crude-oil  prices will start  to tumble.").
72.  It  also  may  be  questioned  whether  it  might  have  taken  far  longer  were  it  not  for  anti-
discrimination  law.  Many  will dispute  how  significant  discrimination  ever  was  in the  past  or  how
much  continues  to  the  present.  For  purposes  of this  article  it  suffices  to  note  that  there  were
numerous  instances of clear  and significant discrimination that  lasted for decades  at a minimum.
73.  In discussing entry barriers, Richard Posner notes the example of U.S. Steel, where the delay
spanned  many  decades.  See  R. POSNER,  supra note  3, at  197-98,  discussed in Kaplow,  Leverage, supra
note 45,  at 538.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
as effectively as it otherwise would.74  When the firm expects practices to have
much  of their  payoff in  the  future,  and  when  there  are  numerous  random
factors affecting the level of the payoff, self-correcting  tendencies will operate
more slowly.  Furthermore, with  conglomerates,  market  discipline may  have
less effect  on the practices  of particular divisions. 75
It would be a mistake  to conclude from the limitations  of the survivorship
process that market evolution  has little or no tendency to produce efficiency.
What is required, and what much of the economic  analysis responding  to the
shortcomings  of simple price  theory  attempts,  is  a more subtle and intricate
analysis  of  particular  practices  in  particular  contexts.  Such  examination
would  permit  one  to  determine  whether  the  market's  corrective  forces  are
sufficient  to produce desirable  consequences  and,  if not, whether  there  exist
legal  remedies  that  offer  potential  for  improvement.  This  view  is  far  less
satisfying  than  the  simple  prescriptions  of either  the  Chicago  School 76  or
those  who earlier took opposite  positions,  because it  suggests  that the  most
appropriate  antitrust  doctrine  may  have  to  be  complex  and  it  may  not  be
possible  to  have  great  confidence  in  most  conclusions  reached  concerning
antitrust.  In this state of affairs, even modest predilections about the outcome
can  produce  substantial  biases  in  the  analysis, 77  so  extreme  caution  is
necessary on the part of the analysts  as well as  the consumers of their product.
2.  Formulation of Legal Rules.  Much  of the argument  of the  new  law and
economics  of antitrust  as  well  as many of the recent doctrinal  developments,
both in the Supreme Court and appellate courts, has been directed toward the
formulation  of legal  rules  and  presumptions.  For example,  in  areas  such  as
vertical  (intrabrand)  restraints  and  tying,  there  has  been  advocacy  and
74.  Frank  Easterbrook  argues,  as  an  explanation  of why  antitrust  defendants  should  not  be
expected  to justify  their practices,  that managers often will  not know why  they are doing what they
do.  See  Easterbrook,  supra note  62,  at  5-6.  But see  Bork,  supra note  50, at  12  ("The  businessman
knows  which  of these  choices  [enhancing  efficiency  or  eliminating  competition]  he  is  making.").
Aside from serious difficulties  concerning  the plausibility of this position,  see Kaplow,  Leverage, supra
note 45, at 543 n. 118,  the fact  that even  those adopting the practices  are unaware of their purposes
or effects would make it even  less likely that the market's  natural selection would operate quickly  or
effectively.
75.  See  also  Scherer,  supra  note  45,  at  986-88  (citing  empirical  evidence  questioning  the
effectiveness  of the takeover  mechanism  in  eliminating inefficient  performance).
76.  The  desire  for  simple,  concrete,  manageable  prescriptions  may  explain  much  of  the
attraction  to the Chicago School.  See,  e.g.,  Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on
Some  Recent Relationships, 68  CALIF.  L.  REV.  1, 8-9  (1980);  see  also Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45,  at
555-56 & n.149;  Kauper,  The Burger Court and Antitrust Philosophy, 1981  ANTITRUST  L. SYMP.  1,  12.  For
example,  William  Baxter, a strong advocate of courts using more sophisticated  economic reasoning,
insists  on stopping short of having courts consider recent advances in economic analysis, for fear that
"'the lesson  plan"  for the  courts  will  "become[]  complicated  so  greatly."  Baxter, supra note 30,  at
320.
77.  An important  instance  involves  the  bias that can result  from  the order in which  analysis is
conducted.  See Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45, at 552-55; see also Fox,  The Politics of Law and Economics
in Judicial Decision Making:  Antitrust as a  Window,  61  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  554,  575-76  (1986)  (attributing
Frank Easterbrook's  view to his selection of assumptions,  a selection made on political, not economic
or legal  grounds).
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doctrinal movement from a per se prohibition to a rule of reason. 78  Similarly,
there  has been increasing support for requiring proof of market power  in an
increasing  range  of contexts. 79  In addition,  the requirement  that  a  plaintiff
alleging predatory pricing prove that the defendant's  prices  were  below cost,
appropriately  defined,  has  generally  been  well  received  by  the courts  in the
past  decade,  although  not  without  qualification. 80  More  generally,  analysts
advocating  an  economic  approach  have been hostile to considering  evidence
of a  defendant's  intent when  evaluating  conduct.81
In  each  case,  the  suggestion  is  that  these  results  follow  from  economic
analysis.  This  subsection  demonstrates  how  none  of  these  results  is  the
necessary  implication  of an  economic  approach;  in each  instance,  economic
analysis could be used to support contrary positions.  The discussion here will
not, however, consider which positions on each question are most convincing;
rather it  will be confined  to the issue of whether particular  results  inhere  in
economic  logic.
The  rule of reason  might appear  to have  a  natural  affinity with economic
analysis  because  the  rule  requires  consideration  of  all  the  economically
relevant  factors,  whereas  the  per  se  rule  cuts  analysis  short.8 2  Yet  the
distinction between per se rules  and the rule of reason  is much like the more
general distinction between rules and standards.  With respect to that general
distinction,  it has  been long recognized  that  the choice  often  has  less  to do
with the goals of the particular system  of rules  than with the  degree to which
more rigid  rules will produce error and more open-ended  rules  will produce
uncertainty  and  impose  additional  cost  in  their  application.  It  is  precisely
such trade-offs  that economic analysis of legal procedure demands be made. 83
78.  Sylvania reversed Schwinn on  the per se illegality of vertical  territorial  restraints, see supra at
187,  although  vertical  price  restraints  are  still  per  se  illegal,  see  Continental  T.V.,  Inc.  v.  GTE
Sylvania,  Inc.,  433  U.S.  36,  51  n.18  (1977);  Monsanto  Co. v.  Spray-Rite  Serv.  Corp.,  465 U.S.  752,
761  n.7  (1984)  (Court refusing  to  reconsider  per  se  rule  in  that  case),  despite  advocacy  to  the
contrary, see, e.g.,  Posner,  The Next  Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  6,  8-14  (1981).  Abolition  of the  per  se  rule  for  tying,  which  has  long  been
advocated  by the Chicago  School, see, e.g.,  R.  BORK, supra note 3,  at  365-81;  Bowman, supra note  14,
received  four votes  in Jefferson  Parish  Hosp. Dist.  No.  2  v.  Hyde,  466  U.S.  2  (1984).
79.  See,  e.g.,  Jefferson  Parish  Hosp.  Dist.  No.  2  v.  Hyde,  466 U.S.  2,  11-18  (1984)  (discussing
nature of market  power  requirement  in  tying  context);  General  Leaseways  Inc.  v.  National  Truck
Leasing Ass'n,  744  F.2d 588,  596 (7th Cir.  1984)  (Posner, J.); Jack Walters  & Sons Corp. v.  Morton
Bldg.,  Inc.,  737  F.2d  698  (7th  Cir.)  (Posner, J.)  (tying  arrangement),  cert.  denied,  469  U.S.  1018
(1984);  Valley  Liquors, Inc.  v. Renfield  Importers,  Ltd.,  678  F.2d 742,  745 (7th Cir.  1982)  (Posner,
J.);  Easterbrook,  supra note  62,  at  19-23.  The  Supreme  Court  has  not,  however,  adopted  a
requirement  of market  power in all antitrust cases.  See, e.g.,  NCAA v.  Board of Regents  of the Univ.
of Okla.,  468  U.S.  85,  109-10  (1984).
80.  See, e.g.,  III P.  AREEDA &  D. TURNER,  supra note 58, ch.  7C;  P.  AREEDA,  ANTrrRUST  ANALYSIS
191  n.19  (3d ed.  1981)  (citing commentary); Spivak,  The Chicago SchoolApproach to Single Firm Exercises
of Monopoly  Power:  4  Response, 52  AN~rRUST  LJ. 651,  654-63  (1983)  (discussing cases).
81.  See, e.g.,  General Leaseways,  Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 595-96 (7th
Cir.  1984)  (Posner, J.); P.  AREEDA  & D.  TURNER,  supra note 58,  714.2  (Supp.  1987).
82.  The classic  statement of the rule of reason  is in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,  246
U.S. 231,  238  (1918).
83.  See, e.g.,  Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD.  257 (1974).
Not  all advocating  the use  of economics  in antitrust  insist  on  an  inherent  tension  between  per se
rules and economics.  See,  e.g.,  Breyer, supra note 50,  at 8.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
That a per se prohibition against horizontal price  fixing is generally  suported
by those  favoring an economic approach  illustrates  this  point.
8 4
Complicating the choice between  a per se rule and the rule of reason  is the
ambiguity  that  surrounds  their  meaning,  especially  in  the  case of the  latter.
Richard  Posner  has  remarked  that  the  "content  of the  Rule  of Reason  is
largely  unknown;  in  practice,  it  is  little  more  than  a  euphemism  for
nonliability."8 5  If one takes this remark seriously,  then all calls for the rule of
reason  (which are now heard in connection with every doctrine, except simple
horizontal  price  fixing)  should  be  understood  as  either  intentionally  or
unconsciously  disguised  attempts  to remove the area from  antitrust scrutiny.
Frank Easterbrook has  similarly  criticized  the rule of reason  as being largely
devoid  of  content,8 6  and  in  its  place  advocates  a  series  of  five  filters
(presumptions) through  which  a  plaintiff must  pass  in order  to demonstrate
liability.8 7  In principle the  approach  of trying  to design  such  presumptions,
where  possible,  is  sound.  Easterbrook's  particular set, however,  seems  even
more  likely  than  the  rule  of reason  to  be  tantamount  to  per  se  legality.a8
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the rule  of reason,  as  currently  formulated,
does not permit the open-ended inquiry contemplated by statements  equating
it  with  a  complete  economic  analysis  in  that  it  will  not  consider  economic
benefits  of abandoning  competition  in particular instances.8 9
The  preference  for  a  market  power  proof requirement  also  appears  to
involve  the application of an  economic  approach,  because  economic  analysis
indicates  that, absent  any  such power,  there can be no anticompetitive  effect
from  restrictive  practices.  Yet,  as  with  the  rule  of  reason,  it  does  not
84.  See, e.g.,  Barry Wright Corp. v. IlT  Grinnel Corp.,  724 F.2d 227,  234 (1st Cir. 1983)  (Breyer,
J.);  R.  BORK,  supra note  3, at 279  (naked price  fixing).
85.  Posner,  The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:  Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI.  L.  REV.  1, 14  (1977);  see also Foer,  The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27  ST.  Louis  U.L.J.
331,  337-38 (1983)  ("With only slight exaggeration,  there is really only one  thing one needs to know
about the rule  of reason:  when  the rule of reason  is applied,  the defendant virtually always wins.").
86.  See Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at 9-14.
87.  See id. at  14-39.  One  ambiguity  in  Easterbrook's  framework  concerns  whether the  plaintiff
who  has passed through all  five filters is deemed  to have  prevailed  or must then still prove liability
under the  rule of reason that Easterbrook  has  criticized.
88.  See Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45, at  529  n.57; see also id. at  544  n. 119 (criticizing  part of
Easterbrook's  foundation  for  his  tendency  to  err  in  the  direction  of antitrust  defendants).  The
discussion  that follows  of the market power  threshold also refers  to one of Easterbrook's  filters.
89.  This  is the holding of National  Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United  States, 435 U.S.  679
(1978);  see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,  Inc.,  446 U.S. 643, 646-50  (1980).  In their exuberance
to see  recent Supreme  Court  doctrine  as  a  wholesale adoption  of their economic  approach,  some
Chicago  School advocates have  misunderstood  this aspect of Engineers.  For example, Peter Gerhart
claims that only  "a  literal interpretation"  of Engineers might be seen as embodying  the false equation
of  competition  and  rivalry,  see  infra  subsection  IV-B-I,  and  the  concomitant  prohibition  on
considering the benefits deriving from ethical or safety norms.  See Gerhart, supra note 2, at 331.  Yet
on the very next page he quotes  the portion of Engineers that rules out consideration of precisely such
a  defense.  See  id.  at  332.  Later  in the  article,  he returns  to  his  original claim.  See  id. at  342.  As
another example, Thomas Kauper argues that this aspect of Engineers "can  also be utilized to support
the  contention  that  the  Burger  Court's  antitrust  doctrine  is  solely  efficiency  oriented,"  a  rather
remarkable  claim  given  his  own  characterization  two  sentences  earlier  that,  under  Engineers,
"[w]hether  competition  is  economically,  socially  or  politically  undesirable  is  simply  not a  relevant
issue."  Kauper, supra note  76, at  6-7  (emphasis added).
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immediately  follow  that economic  analysis  necessarily  supports the rule  that
most directly reflects  its application.  Consider  the context of horizontal price
fixing.  Frank Easterbrook  has argued that the "market  power inquiry logically
precedes  the question  of whether  a  restraint  is  'naked'  and  thus  within  the
scope  of the  per  se  rule." 90  But  such  logic  is  formal  at  best.  If  a  naked
horizontal  price-fixing scheme  has been detected,  and one  is virtually certain
that such  schemes  are undesirable,  what  sense does  it  make to  require proof
of market power when  such an inquiry  is inevitably  difficult  and costly?9 1  In
addition,  even  if market  power  must  be  established,  one  must  decide  how
much market  power must be demonstrated,  by what evidence, and with what
degree  of confidence.  Such  requirements  further  suggest  the complexity  of
the link between  an  economic  approach  and particular antitrust rules.92
The emergence  of a marginal cost pricing test for predatory pricing could
also  be  seen  as  an  outgrowth  of the  application  of an  economic  analysis,
although  much of the criticism of the Areeda-Turner  test has  come from the
most prominent  economists  who  study antitrust.93  A  substantial  portion  of
the  dispute  concerns  the  appropriate  role  to  be  given  complex  dynamic
considerations  that  are central  to predatory  phenomena.  Some of the  more
recent  court  decisions  on  predatory  pricing  have  veered  from  the  Areeda-
Turner approach  on precisely  these grounds. 94  Disputes concerning whether
predatory investment and innovation should be treated similarly to predatory
pricing  often  turn  on  similar  factors. 95  Arguments  favoring  the  simpler
Areeda-Turner  approach  have, not  surprisingly,  been quite  similar to  those
90.  Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at  21.
91.  See  Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note 45,  at  547 n.127  (developing this  criticism of Easterbrook
and defending  Phillip Areeda,  whom Easterbrook castigates  for suggesting that there should be some
antitrust  violations that do not require  proof of market power, see Easterbrook,  supra note 62,  at 29
n.62).
In addition, one could infer market power from the intent implicit in the practice, which raises the
question of the role of inquiries into intent  in an  economic  approach to  antitrust, discussed later  in
this  subsection.
92.  The  Supreme  Court  has  recently  and  clearly  reaffirmed  its  rejection  of a  market  power
requirement in cases involving naked restraints.  See  NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468  U.S.  85,  109  (1984).
93.  See, e.g.,  Baumol,  Quasi-Permanence  of Price Reductions: A  Policy for Prevention of Predatory  Pricing,
89 YALE L.J.  1 (1979);Josko  & Klevorick, A Framework  for Analyzing Predatory  Pricing  Policy, 89 YALE L.J.
213  (1979);  Scherer, Predatory Pricing  and the Sherman Act:  A  Comment, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.  869  (1976);
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A  Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE  L.J. 284  (1977);  see also Joskow,
The Political  Content of Antitrust:  Comment, in ANTITRUST  LAW  AND EcONOMICS 196, 202  (0.  Williamson
ed.  1980)  (marginal  cost  pricing  test  has  not  prevailed  "because  of  the  triumph  of  economic
efficiency considerations  in  the interpretation  of antitrust  statutes").
94.  See  Spivak, supra note  80, at  655-62  (citing, e.g.,  William  Inglis  & Sons  Baking  Co.  v.  ITT
Continental Baking  Co., 668 F.2d  1014,  1035-36 (9th Cir.  1981)  (prices above average variable cost
may be predatory;  ultimate  test based on effectiveness  in achieving  predatory purposes),  cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982));  Bordon, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 514-16 (6th Cir.  1982) (price manipulation
that achieves predatory purpose is a violation  even if price is not below  average variable cost),  vacated
per stipulation, 461  U.S.  940  (1983)).
95.  See  III  P.  AREEDA  &  D.  TURNER,  supra note  58,  718-19,  721-22;  Ordover  &  Willig,  An
Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing  and Product Innovation, 91  YALE  L.J.  8  (1981).LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
offered  in support of per se rules rather  than the rule of reason.96  Discussion
of the marginal cost pricing test compliments  that of the rule of reason in that,
although  both  have  been  associated  with  the  economic  approach,  they
represent  opposite  choices  in  analytically  similar  situations.97   This
juxtaposition  does  not  indicate  that  either  rule  is  mistaken;  rather,  it
reinforces  the argument  that  there  is  no automatic  connection  between  the
use  of economic  analysis  and  particular  methods  of formulating  antitrust
rules.
As  a  final  example,  consider  the  hostility  often  associated  with  the
economic approach to antitrust and expressed with growing frequency toward
inquiries  into  defendants'  intent in  order to  resolve  antitrust  disputes.  The
basic  problem  is  that  the  arguments  rejecting  altogether  the  relevance  of
intent  are often  based  primarily  on  mistakes  commonly  made  in  particular
inquiries  into intent.  More  specifically,  if intent  is  interpreted  to encompass
the  simple desire to  operate so effectively  as  to  surpass one's competitors,  it
does not indicate any basis for antitrust liability.98  It hardly follows, however,
that intent is irrelevant to an economic inquiry.99  For example,  clear evidence
that firms'  intent in entering a complex joint venture arrangement was  to use
their integrated  activities  as a cover for price fixing is relevant in determining
the likely effect of such an agreement.  In determining the effects of allegedly
predatory  behavior,  one  might be  aided  by evidence  that a  firm  reduced  its
prices  to a  lower level  than  was  profit maximizing  in the short run precisely
because  it  anticipated  that  this  would  bankrupt  a  new  entrant,  keep  away
future  entrants,  and thus permit higher, monopolistic prices  in the  future.
It  may  reasonably  be  objected  that  such  evidence  will  often  be  hard  to
come by,' 00  and may necessitate costly discovery if deemed admissible.  Yet it
96.  See  III  P.  AREEDA  & D. TURNER,  supra note  58,  ch.  7C;  Barry Wright  Corp. v. [IT Grinnel
Corp.,  724 F.2d 227, 231-32,  234 (1st Cir.  1983)  (Breyer,J.)  (explicitly making the analogy to  per se
rules).
97.  Another tension is that the marginal cost pricing test for predation assumes that the relevant
costs can be measured with reasonable accuracy.  In that event, however, the market power inquiries
often  thought  necessary  could employ  similar information,  without  the need for  market definition.
See,  e.g.,  Landes  & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94  HARV.  L.  REV.  937,  940-41  (1981).
98.  This  conclusion  follows  regardless of the  strength or manner in  which intent  is expressed.
Intent to "crush,  destroy, or mutilate" the competition is perfectly laudable if the method envisioned
is the  production of a better product.
99.  The  Supreme  Court  in  Chicago Board's famous  discussion of the  rule  of reason  approach
explicitly  linked  the  utility of inquiries  into  intent  to the  understanding of the effects  of behavior.
Chicago  Bd.  of Trade  v. United  States,  246  U.S.  231,  238  (1918)  ("the  purpose  or  end  . . . [is]
relevant  . . . not because  a  good intention  will  save  an  otherwise  objectionable  regulation  or  the
reverse;  but  because  knowledge  of intent  may  help  the  court  to  interpret  facts  and  to  predict
consequences");  see also Brown Shoe Co.  v. United States,  370 U.S. 294,  329 n.48  (1962);  Broadcast
Music,  Inc.  v. CBS,  441  U.S.  1, 19  (1979).
100.  See,  e.g.,  Areeda,  in Are  Economists Taking Over?,  in  CHANGING  ANTITRUST  STANDARDS  24,  26
(Conf. Bd.  Research  Bull.  No.  144,  1983).  One  reason  often  given  is  that  lawyers,  aware  of the
relevance of such evidence, will advise that it be destroyed, or not created.  Of course, there are some
ethical  questions raised  by such behavior, and  even if there were  not any  prohibitions  currently,  it
would  be  possible  to  enact  ethical  or  direct  legal  sanctions  against  such  advice  or  practices  by
attorneys  or  others.  As  to evidence  never  created,  there  are  surely  limits  on  the ability  of large
corporations  to  make  complex,  long-range  decisions,  often  involving  the  coordination  of many
subdivisions, without any  written communications.  This is  a rather large  issue that has received  far
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is  hardly obvious  that direct  proof of the effects of various  complex  business
arrangements  and  practices-itself  involving  extensive  discovery  and  heavy
reliance  on expert witnesses-will  be easier to  come  by,  less costly,  or more
reliable.' 0'  Just as intent is often inferred  from effects, 1 0 2 it is also reasonable
in many circumstances to infer effects from intent.  After all, if one assumes, as
many Chicago School analysts are inclined to do, that firms in the market are a
better judge of the effects of practices  than are courts,103  then it follows that
such evidence  of intent  should be  given  great weight indeed.  This evidence
would  necessarily  be  deemed  superior  to  any  attempt  to  reconstruct  firms'
decisionmaking processes using expert witnesses in the course of litigation.l0 4
An  economic approach  does, however,  have much relevance  to an intent
inquiry in that it will help determine which  courses of action, if successful,  are
likely  to be detrimental.  Economic analysis  and inquiries  into intent are not
inherently  at  odds.  The question  of how much  weight  one should  place  on
various  evidence  of a firm's intent  is  a difficult one, and  the only  substantial
insight  economic  theory  is  likely  to  offer  is  the  general  natural  selection
argument  that  firms  more  able  to fulfill  their intentions  are  more  likely  to
survive than those  that are not.10 5
IV
HAS  THERE  BEEN  SIGNIFICANT  CHANGE  IN THE  ROLE  OF  ECONOMIC
ISSUES  IN  DECIDING  ANTITRUST  CASES?  ECONOMICS  AS  A
GOAL  VERSUS  THE ONLY  GOAL
The  first  two  parts  of this  article  suggest  that  there  has  not  been  any
significant increase in the degree to which  the Supreme Court uses economic
analysis  in addressing economic questions, and that changes  in the content of
economic  analysis over the past few decades have no necessary  connection to
most developments  in antitrust doctrine and even less of a link to many of the
positions advocated by  the Chicago School of antitrust.  This part examines  a
third  possible  explanation:  that  the  politics  and ideology  of the  Court  and
various antitrust analysts provide the best interpretation for much of the shift
that has  been noted.
One  commonly  offered  observation  is  that  economic  efficiency-
regardless  of the  particular  content  or  method  of economic  analysis-has
too  little attention;  the  limited  claim  here  is  that it  is  hardly  obvious  a  priori  that  an  economic
approach  should ignore this source  of information.
101.  See,  e.g.,  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note  59,  at  110  (discussing predatory  pricing).
102.  Recall the common  presumption that one  intends the  natural  consequences  of one's acts.
103.  See supra subsection II1-B-1.
104.  Frank  Easterbrook has  argued that antitrust defendants  are  often unaware  of the effects  of
their  practices.  See  supra  note  74;  Easterbrook,  supra note  62,  at  5-6.  In  many  of the  relevant
contexts,  this  claim is  implausible.  See  Kaplow,  Leverage, supra note  45, at  543 n. 118.  For example,
firms do not create complex joint ventures by accident, and they do not make major pricing decisions
by  spinning  roulette wheels.  The claim  in  the  text  is not  that firms'  intent will  always  be  clear  to
those on  the inside or readily ascertainable  from without,  but rather that it  offers a  rather obvious
potential  source of information  in  many  instances.
105.  See supra subsection  III-B-I.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
moved from being merely one of many dimensions  of antitrust inquiry to  the
sole, or at least the heavily dominant,  objective of antitrust in the mind of the
Supreme  Court. 1 0 6  Of course,  even  if a  radical  transformation  along  these
lines  has  taken place,  the  analysis  presented  in part III casts  some doubt  on
whether  such  a  shift  necessarily  explains  the  changes  in  the  content  of
doctrine  usually  associated  with  the  Chicago  School.  Nonetheless,  such  a
departure  from past practice  is  unlikely  to be without  effect  and would  itself
reflect changes in the Court's approach that might have broader ramifications.
As  the  introduction  to  this  article  suggested,  in  the  light  of  changes  in
Supreme  Court jurisprudence  in  many  areas  over  the  past  decades,  one
should expect  to see  parallel movements  in antitrust.
Section  A considers how much  change has  occurred  over the past decade
in the Supreme Court's articulation of the purposes of the antitrust laws.  The
general  conclusion  is  that  the  alleged  movement  is  typically  overstated. 0 7
There  are  no  clear  affirmative  statements  embracing  the  philosophy  that
economic efficiency  is all.  At most, one observes  a relative absence of strong
statements  concerning many competing  objectives noted by the Court in the
past. 108
Section  B  interprets  whatever  change  has  occurred,  as  well  as additional
movement  that  might  well  emerge  in  the  future.  Also  considered  in  that
section  are  the  political  and  institutional  meanings  of  such  a  shift  in
objectives.  Of  course,  whenever  a  substantial  shift  in  ultimate  objectives
occurs,  a  strong political element  is  by definition present.  Section  B further
argues  that  such a change as  the one discussed  in  connection  with antitrust,
106.  See,  e.g.,  Spivak,  supra note  80,  at  672  &  n.96  (discussing  prominent  Chicago  School
adherents).  Spivak also  notes  that Judge Posner  has essentially  ruled  to this  effect  in  many  of his
recent  antitrust  opinions.  See  id.  at 672  n.97;  see also  Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge
Posner's Application of His Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine, 32  DE  PAUL  L.  REV.  839,  881  (1983).
These  claims  are  somewhat  difficult  to  interpret.  Posner does  repeatedly  cite  Reiter  v.  Sonotone
Corp.,  442  U.S.  330,  343  (1979),  to  support  the  view  that  "consumer  welfare"-by  which  the
Chicago  School often means "efficiency  to the exclusion of all other objectives"-has  been endorsed
as  the  purpose  of  antitrust.  This  argument  and  interpretation  concerning  Reter  v.  Sonotone are
discussed  in  subsection  IV-A-2.
This  article will  not explore the additional fallacy  common  in the efficiency-only  approach:  that
the  concept  of efficiency necessarily  rules  out direct  consideration  of "alternative"  objectives.  For
example,  as  Herbert  Hovenkamp has  noted, conventional  free-rider  arguments,  which the  Chicago
School emphasizes in explaining  vertical restraints,  could justify, on economic grounds,  concerns for
political  power and opportunity  for small businesses.  See Hovenkamp, supra note  12,  at 243.
107.  Richard  Markovits,  a  supporter of the  Burger  Court's changes,  initially  puts  the argument
somewhat more realistically than  most.  "In  short, although the tea leaves are admittedly  scanty,  the
Burger  Court  appears  to  be  preparing  an  antitrust  brew  with  an  exclusively  efficiency  flavor."
Markovits, supra note 6, at 183.  Yet, aside  from this qualification, he proceeds as though there is  very
little doubt.  See,  e.g.,  id. at  184  ("As we  have seen,  the  mature  Burger Court  rejected  the  Warren
Court's noneconomic  values."),  196  ("Burger Court has distinguished itself..,  by insisting that the
antitrust  laws  contain  an exclusively  economic test of legality"  (emphasis  added)).
108.  Even  this  later  aspect  is  difficult  to  interpret,  as  the  time  period  and  number  of cases  is
sufficiently limited to leave some doubt as to the significance of any trend.  After all, it has never been
claimed  to  be  the  case  that  dozens  of  opinions  each  decade  in  the  past  contained  substantial
elaborations  of the  purposes of antitrust,  including  explicit  emphasis  on  noneconomic  objectives.
And numerous  references  to competing objectives still appear with moderate  frequency in  Supreme
Court opinions.  For some examples, see  subsection IV-A-2.
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when read against the background  of the legislative and social history  as well
as prior  interpretations  of the  antitrust  laws,  contains  an  important  activist
element,  as  that  term  is  understood  in  the  current  legal  and  political
climate. 1 0 9  To  the  extent  one  takes  seriously  the  claims  of  the  current
national  administration,  recent judicial  appointees,  and  their  sympathizers,
this  characterization  of  the  changes  supports  the  frequent  allegation  that
avowed opposition to judicial activism more often reflects opportunism rather
than any  sincere,  principled belief."10
A.  Assessing the  Change in  Antitrust Opinions
1.  The  Early Cases.  Although  some  have  taken  the  view  that,  from  the
beginning,  the  sole  objective  of  the  antitrust  laws  was  to  be  economic
efficiency,"'  there  has  never  been  any  dispute  over  the  fact  that  leading
antitrust  opinions  from  the  beginning  have  made  explicit  references  to
broader purposes,  such as  the protection  of small  business,  entrepreneurial
freedom, buyer freedom  of choice,  the maintenance  of deconcentration  both
as a  way of life and to avert undue influence on the political process, and  the
preservation  or  promotion  of  a  fair  distribution  of  income,  particularly
between  large  economic  enterprises  and  consumers.  One  of the  first  well-
known  instances  is Justice  Peckham's  reference  in  Trans-Missouri to  "small
dealers and worthy men whose lives had been spent" in business. 112  In Alcoa,
Learned  Hand  stated  that  "[t]hroughout  the history of these  statutes  it  has
been constantly  assumed  that  one  of their  purposes  was  to perpetuate  and
preserve,  for its  own  sake and  in  spite  of possible  cost,  an  organization  of
industry in small  units which  can  effectively compete  with each  other."" 13
Interestingly,  both statements  refer explicitly  to  the Sherman  Act,  which
has been the focus of the strongest  claims  to the effect  that the antitrust laws
contemplated only economic efficiency, rather than the Clayton Act (including
the  1950  amendment  to  section  7)  or  the  Robinson-Patman  Act,  where
efficiency-only  proponents  have  been  more  willing  to  concede  alternative
motivations.  Moreover, these statements precede the Warren Court era, thus
indicating  a  long-standing  pattern rather  than  a  temporary  shift  during that
109.  This  article  will  not  explore  the  important  question  of  whether  these  conventional
interpretations are meaningful  from various perspectives.  Rather, it makes  the rather modest  claim
that alleged  and advocated  antitrust developments  concerning  the law's  fundamental  objectives  fall
within the concept  of activism  as  it is  generally  understood.
110.  Many would  question whether  "principled"  opposition to activism  is conceptually  coherent.
See  supra note  109.
111.  See infra subsection  IV-B- 1.
112.  United States  v.  Trans-Missouri  Freight Ass'n,  166  U.S. 290,  323-24  (1897).  Interestingly,
although  Klor's,  Inc.  v.  Broadway-Hale  Stores,  Inc.,  359  U.S.  207  (1959),  an  early  Warren  Court
decision,  is perhaps  most strongly associated  with this view of antitrust laws, it contains  no reference
to  this statement  in  Trans-Missouri or similar  statements,  and devotes  only passing attention  to the
objectives  of the  antitrust  laws,  concluding  its  brief discussion  by  referring  to  the  potential  for
monopoly, as  traditionally understood.  See id.  at  213-14.
113.  United States  v.  Aluminum Co.  of Am.,  148  F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).  For a discussion
of how this view might be reconciled with the statement  in United States  v.  United States Steel Corp.,
251  U.S. 417, 451  (1920),  that  size per se is not an offense, see Kaplow, Market Power, supra note 45,
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time.  When  one moves  to the Warren  Court, and beyond  the  Sherman  Act
context, similar statements  can be found.  The review of the legislative history
of the 1950 amendment to section  7 of the Clayton Act in Brown Shoe includes
the following  statement:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
was a fear of what was considered  to be a rising tide of economic concentration  in the
American economy ....  Other considerations  cited  in  support of the  bill were  the
desirability  of retaining  "local  control"  over  industry  and  the  protection  of small
businesses.  Throughout the recorded  discussion may be found examples of Congress'
fear not only of accelerated  concentration  of economic  power on  economic grounds,
but  also  the  threat  to  other  values  a  trend  toward  concentration  was  thought  to
pose.114
Perhaps more important was  the Court's later comment  that, although
[i]t  is competition,  not competitors,  which  the  Act  protects[,]  . . .we cannot  fail  to
recognize Congress'  desire  to promote competition  through  the protection of viable,
small,  locally  owned  businesses.  Congress  appreciated  that occasional  higher  costs
and prices might result from  the maintenance of fragmented industries  and  markets.
It resolved these  competing considerations  in favor of decentralization.115
Antitrust  court  decisions  up  through  the  time  of the  Warren  Court  thus
clearly  reflect  the  view  that  objectives  other  than  economic  efficiency,
narrowly  construed, are part  of the purposes  of antitrust legislation.
2.  Supreme Court Decisions of the Past Decade.  In light of the  history briefly
recounted  in subsection  1, it would indeed represent an important shift if the
Burger  Court's  recent  decisions  explicitly  rejected  earlier  statements  and
adopted  the  view  that  economic  efficiency  was  the  sole  objective  of  the
antitrust laws.  Most of the support for this frequently advanced  description is
confined  to a handful of passages  in some of the Court's recent opinions.  As
an initial observation,  given that none of the referenced  language spans more
than  a  sentence or  two  and none  represents  a direct  attempt to address  this
issue, it is  impossible  to make  a  persuasive  claim  beyond  the  argument  that
such language constitutes hints of things to come.  One rather obvious source
of support for this characterization  of the evidence of a shift as modest at best
is  the simple fact that the Court neither cites nor otherwise addresses  any  of
the  well-known  discussions  of  the  multiple  objectives  position  it  has
supposedly  rejected in  recent cases.
It is  best to begin  the inquiry  with  the most widely  cited Supreme Court
statement  on the  subject, that  found in Reiter v.  Sonotone:  "On  the  contrary,
[the  floor  debates]  suggest  that  Congress  designed  the  Sherman  Act  as  a
'consumer  welfare  prescription.'  R.  Bork,  The  Antitrust  Paradox  66
(1978)." 116  Believe it  or not, that  single sentence  and citation  has been  the
major source of much of the argument.  Not only  is the evidence  exceedingly
thin in quantity,  it also falls far short of supporting the position that the goal
of economic  efficiency,  to the exclusion  of all else, was therein adopted.
114.  Brown  Shoe Co. v.  United States,  370  U.S.  294,  315-16 (1962).
115.  Id.  at 344.
116.  Reiter  v.  Sonotone Corp., 442  U.S.  330, 343  (1979).
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First,  the  phrase  "consumer  welfare  prescription"  admits  substantial
ambiguity.  Although Robert Bork and others may have economic efficiency  in
mind,  it  would  hardly  be  surprising  if the  Court  intended  a  meaning more
literal  and  in  accord  with  common  usage-the  welfare  of consumers.  That
interpretation, of course, often conflicts with economic efficiency.  It excludes,
for  example,  economies  that  accrue  to  a  firm  but  are  not  passed  on  to
consumers.  In  fact,  this  straightforward  reading  is  more  in accord  with  the
distributional  interpretation  of the Sherman  Act's  objectives. 17  One  would
be  hard-pressed to support either position  based on this  brief passage.",
A second  major defect is  that even if the statement in  Reiter v.  Sonotone is
interpreted as expressing the antitrust laws' concern with economic efficiency,
it  does  not  on  its  face  purport  to  exclude  other  objectives.  Thus,  the
statement  is irrelevant  to the  question at hand because  those who advocate  a
multiple-goal interpretation  and approach generally embrace efficiency  as one
of the important goals.  In fact,  the context of the quotation  clearly suggests
that the statement of the consumer welfare goal is being used in an inclusive,
rather  than  exclusive,  fashion.  The  issue  in  Reiter v.  Sonotone,  after all,  was
whether  consumers  who purchase  products  for their own use  have standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act." 9  The context  thus stands the  exclusive
interpretation  on its  head, for it was  conceded  by all parties  and  apparently
agreed  by  the  Court  that  various  other  potential  plaintiffs-businesses  in
particular-did  have  standing.  Thus,  to  interpret  the  Court's  remark  as
referring only to consumers  would be odd indeed.' 20  The only question was
whether consumers  were to be included among those allowed to bring private
suits.  It is  hardly surprising that the Court provided a unanimous  affirmative
response. 12 1  The  paragraph  containing  the  "consumer  welfare"  reference
exists  to support  the proposition  that "[nlothing  in the legislative history  of
§  4  conflicts  with"  the  holding  that  injured  consumers  could  bring  private
suits.
12 2  The sentence preceding  the reference  to  the floor debates  refers  to
the  respondent's  assertion  that  the  language  of  section  4  "was  clearly
intended  to exclude pecuniary  injuries"  to consumers. 123
117.  See,  e.g.,  Lande,  Wealth  Transfers as the  Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34  HASTINGS  LJ. 65  (1982).
118.  The  fact  that  the citation  is  to Judge Bork,  who  takes  the  efficiency  view,  is  insufficient  to
resolve  the controversy.  In addition  to  the arguments  in text,  it is  clear  that such  a brief quotation
with no indication of context is  inevitably difficult  to interpret.  Moreover, since there are numerous
clear statements of the efficiency  view  in  Bork's  book that  were  not quoted,  it  seems  all  the  more
difficult  to claim  that this brief reference  was  meant  to signal  adoption of the efficiency  view.
119.  See 442  U.S.  at 334.
120.  In fact, the Chicago School position  is that, in many  contexts  (when the affected  businesses
are competitors of rather than purchasers  from  defendants), only consumers  should  be permitted to
sue.  See,  e.g.,  Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at 33-39.  The Court's approach,  taken as  a whole,  seems
more  difficult to reconcile  with  that position than with  one  that considers  goals  beyond  economic
efficiency.
121.  But see 442 U.S.  at 345-46  (Rehnquist, J.  concurring)  (worrying about the resulting increase
in  litigation that  will be  produced,  but seeing it  as a  question for Congress).
122.  422 U.S.  at  342.
123.  Id. at 343  (emphasis added).LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
The only remaining  argument that could  be offered  to support  the claim
concerning the historic significance of Reiter v.  Sonotone is that the mere fact of
the reference to the first part of Bork's book reflects a wholesale adoption of a
new  philosophy  of antitrust.  Gordon  Spivak's  assessment  of this  argument
provided  a  cogent  reply:  "Imagine  that:  the  Supreme  Court  overruled
decades  of antitrust  precedents  simply  by quoting  three  words  from Judge
Bork's book." 
24
Nor do the rest of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements  amount to
a  wholesale  revolution  on  this  front.  One  of the  strongest  statements  in
support of the  Chicago School position is  that  found in BMI, indicating that
the  Court's  per  se  inquiry  is  to  determine  "whether  the  practice  facially
appears  to  be  one  that  would  always  or  almost  always  tend  to  restrict
competition  and  decrease  output,  . . . or instead  one designed  to  'increase
economic  efficiency  and  render  markets  more,  rather  than  less
competitive.'  "125  Yet statements  to this  effect are hardly  new,  as  evidenced
by the Court's citation  of Northern Pacific in support of this proposition.
2 6  In
addition,  as  the discussion  in  part III  indicates,  the focus  on competition  in
Engineers is not at all necessarily an endorsement  of the efficiency approach,  as
either  an  exclusive  objective  or  otherwise.' 27  Surely  additional  passages
could  be  cited,  but,  given  the  extremely  limited  support  offered  by  the
language  most  frequently  employed  in  discussions  of whether  the  efficiency
objective  has fully  triumphed,  one cannot  reasonably expect  that even lesser
clues  would  substantially  tip the balance.
128
124.  Spivak, supra note 80,  at  673; see also Comment, supra note  106,  at 881  n.213.
125.  Broadcast  Music,  Inc.  v.  CBS,  441  U.S.  1,  19-20  (1979)  (quoting  United States  v.  United
States Gypsum  Co.,  438 U.S.  422, 441  n.16  (1978)).
126.  Northern Pac. Ry.  v.  United  States, 356  U.S.  1, 4  (1958).  Northern Pacific is  a Warren  Court
decision, and  one of the  many  that  has  come under  attack from  the Chicago  School.  See,  e.g.,  R.
BORK,  supra note  3,  at 367.
127.  See supra at  196 & note 89.  Thus, only minimal  support for the efficiency-only approach can
be  gleaned from Engineers' references  to competition and economics.  See, e.g.,  435 U.S.  at 690-91  &
nn.16  &  17.  It  is  also  relevant  that the  entire discussion  of these issues  in Engineers appears  in  a
context  wherein  the Court  was  rejecting  a  defense  that did not appeal  to  the frequently  proffered
non-efficiency  objectives  of  antitrust  and  would  be  ruled  out  quite  readily  by  an  ordinary
interpretation  of  the  word  "competition."  (For  further  exploration  of  the  meanings  of
"competition,"  see subsection  IV-B-I.)
An  example of the significance of this  is Frank  Easterbrook's  thesis  that "[t]he  task of antitrust
policy is to find the right  balance of competition and  cooperation."  Easterbrook, supra note 44,  at
1707; see Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at  1-2.  Since the rule of reason explicitly states otherwise-i.e.,
only  "competition"  is  deemed  relevant-this  is  deeply  problematic  for  his  argument  that  the
Supreme Court's  approach  largely coincides with  his.
128.  Some further  support for  the claim  that the  Supreme  Court has  moved  in  the direction of
considering  only efficiency  can be found  in a footnote in Sylvania, wherein the Court rejects  a lower
court judge's appeal  to  "the  autonomy  of independent businessmen  even  though  [the  restrictions]
have  no  impact  on  'price,  quality,  and  quantity  of  goods  and  services.'  "  433  U.S.  at  53  n.21.
Instead,  the  Court  indicates  that antitrust  policy must  be  linked  in  some  manner  to "marketplace
considerations  [to provide  some]  objective  benchmarks."  Id.  Yet  it specifically  quotes  Schwinn, 388
U.S.  at  374,  in  rejecting  the  alternative  interpretation,  333  U.S.  at  53  n.21,  suggesting  that  the
Court's  statement  in  Sylvania can  hardly be  seen  as  a wholesale  change  from the Warren  Court  on
this  question.  To  illustrate,  the  Warren  Court's  analysis  in  Brown  Shoe,  which  is  often  noted  for
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Not only  is  the affirmative  support weak,  but some  modest  language cuts
against  the notion that  efficiency  now  reigns  alone.  Maricopa  129  is  probably
the decision most embarrassing  to the Chicago School position in that it failed
to accept a more lenient approach toward maximum price fixing, as advocated
by  Frank  Easterbrook. 130  The  Court  placed  "horizontal  agreements  to  fix
maximum  prices  on  the  same  legal--even  if  not  economic-footing  as
agreements  to  fix  minimum  or  uniform  prices."' 3 '  Both  Maricopa  and
Associated General Contractors quoted  language  from  Kiefer-Stewart concerning
the tendency of condemned  practices  to "cripple  the freedom of traders and
thereby  restrain  their  ability  to  sell  in  accordance  with  their  own
judgment."' 32  The  existence  of these  opinions  and  the  statements  within
them  cast  further  doubt  on  the  claim  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  fully
reversed  itself on the question  of the goals  of the antitrust laws.133
Concerning both the objectives of antitrust, discussed in this part, and the
content  of economic  analysis,  considered  in part III,  there  is  the danger  of
drawing stronger inferences than warranted from the fact that a larger portion
of major antitrust decisions by the Burger Court had been in favor of antitrust
defendants,  in  cases  where the  Chicago  School  would  support such  results,
than was  true  of prior Courts.  As  a matter of logic,  much of the  optimistic
reading by Chicago School proponents 134 might be attributed to the following
invalid  syllogism:  (1) The Court has produced  a  given set of results;  (2)  this
set  of  results  has  been  advocated  by  proponents  of  the  new  law  and
economics  of antitrust  (the  Chicago  School);  (3)  therefore,  the  Supreme
Court has been convinced by and therefore has adopted the Chicago School's
economic  interpretation  of and  approach  to  antitrust  law.135  The  hidden
premise necessary  to make this argument valid is that it is impossible to reach
the Court's results without adopting the Chicago School position, lock,  stock,
suggesting nonefficiency  objectives  of antitrust, did quite explicitly ground its decision in its analysis
of effects in  the marketplace.  The same is true  with Alcoa.
Frank  Easterbrook  argues  that  many  of the  numerous  decisions  following  his  approach  are
unanimous.  See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 1705  & n.23.  It is unclear why  it does not seem to him
important  that almost half of the cases  he lists reject his positions in whole or in part.  (Most  of the
directly relevant  language  in the other half of the cases has  already  been  discussed.)
129.  Arizona  v.  Maricopa Co.  Med.  Soc'y, 457  U.S.  332  (1982).
130.  See  Easterbrook, Maximum  Price Fixing, 48  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  886  (1981).
131.  457 U.S.  at 348  (emphasis added).
132.  Kiefer-Stewart  Co.  v. Joseph  E.  Seagram  & Sons,  Inc.,  340  U.S.  211,  213  (1951),  cited in
Arizona  v.  Maricopa  Co. Med.  Soc'y, 457  U.S.  332, 346  (1982),  and Associated Gen'l Contractors  v.
California  State  Council  of Carpenters,  459  U.S.  519,  528-29  & n.18  (1983).  Associated  General
Contractors also  indicated  that  adverse  effects  on  "free  choices  between  market  alternatives  is
inherently  destructive of competitive  conditions  and  may  be condemned  even  without  proof of its
actual market effect."  Id. at 528 (citing Klor's, Inc. v.  Broadway-Hale  Stores, Inc., 459 U.S.  207, 210-
14  (1959)).
133.  As  another example,  although  the Court's  recent decision  in  NCAA  emphasized  effects  on
price and output, 468  U.S. at  107,  it also explicitly referred  to competitors'  ability to compete at two
points, id. at  107,  108.
134.  The same  can be  said of similar readings  by pessimistic opponents  of the Chicago School.
135.  The  logic behind  arguments  that  the Chicago  School  has triumphed  is  rarely  this explicit;
perhaps  coming  closest  is  the  statement  in  Kauper,  supra  note  76,  at  5,  although  he  finds
pronouncement of a Chicago School triumph somewhat premature, id. at 2,  6, 12.  See also Markovits,
supra note  6.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
and barrel.  In rebutting this argument, one obvious point is simply that many
of the  more recent  statements  and decisions  have been  approved  by  a  wide
array of commentators, including  those hostile to the Chicago  School.  More
generally, recalling the argument in the introduction to this article concerning
general  movements in  Supreme  Court decisionmaking  as  well  as the role of
particular rationalizations  for decisions,' 3 6 it would  be a difficult  task indeed
to establish that positions  of any particular group of commentators  have been
adopted  by the Court.
B.  Political Meaning  of the Change:  Judicial  Activism
To  the  extent  one  accepted  the  argument  of  section  A  sufficiently  to
conclude  that  there  has  been  no  significant  change  in  the  Court's  position
concerning the goals of the antitrust laws and further assumed that no further
substantial  change  in  such  a direction  was imminent,  the question  would be
whether continuation  of the past  approach  was  warranted.  Similarly,  if one
believes that  substantial  change  has  already occurred  or is  on the horizon-
for example,  if it  is  going  to  be  implemented,  or at least  attempted,  in  the
federal appellate courts-one would  similarly have to assess  the basis for past
and  potential  future  approaches  concerning  the  purposes  of  antitrust.
Subsection  1 explores the basis in the statutes and  their legislative  history for
various positions on this issue.  It generally concludes that the interpretations
of the  early  courts were  consistent with these foundations,  suggesting  that a
fundamental  departure  would  constitute  an  activist  move.  Subsection  2
briefly  explores  the  dissonance  between  the  fundamental  positive  tenet  of
Chicago law and economics as a whole (beyond the antitrust context),  that the
common  law develops in a manner  that is inevitably efficient, and the central
battle  cry  of  the  Chicago  School's  position  in  antitrust,  that  antitrust
doctrine-which  has been formed by an essentially common law process-has
quite  frequently  been  inefficient.  To  the  extent  this  inconsistency  exists,  it
reinforces  the interpretation  offered  in this article  concerning  the primacy of
the political  and  ideological  dimension  to  proposed  and  allegedly  observed
shifts in antitrust  law along the lines advocated  by  the Chicago  School.
1.  The Antitrust Statutes and Their History.  The very existence of continued
debate  over  whether  the  antitrust  statutes  and  their  legislative  history
contemplate  economic efficiency  as the sole objective  of antitrust doctrine is
striking.  The  position  of  some  Chicago  School  advocates  in  this  area
represents  an  instance  in which  their arguments  are  so  farfetched  that  it  is
hard  to  take  them  seriously;  yet  the  continued  advocacy  of this  position  by
some 137  makes  at  least  a  limited  discussion  necessary.  Moreover,  even  for
136.  On  the latter, see supra note  7.
137.  See, e.g.,  R. BORK,  supra note 3, ch. 2;  Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,  9J.
L.  & EcON.  7 (1966).  One  of the most extreme  statements  is  by Robert  Bork:
There  would  be  little  point  in  reviewing  here  all  of the  positions  that  have  been  advanced
concerning the broad social,  political, and ethical  mandates entrusted  to the courts  through the
Sherman  Act,  or  in  naming  the  persons  who  have  urged  them,  for  there  is  not  a  scintilla of
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those  advocates  who  make  little  use  of  the  statutes  and  their  legislative
history, the fact that they cut strongly against the view of efficiency as the sole
objective  of  the  antitrust  laws  is  relevant  for  interpreting  the  advocates'
implicit views  concerning  the role of the judiciary.
The claim  that the antitrust laws  contemplate  economic efficiency as  their
sole objective  has a number of deficiencies,  many of which are independently
sufficient  to  rule  out  the  possibility.  First,  those  enacting  the  laws-
particularly  in  the case of the Sherman  Act-could not have understood  the
concept as  we are  now asked  to believe they did.  Second,  if one accepts  the
Chicago School's analysis of restrictive practices,  the language of many of the
enactments is virtually impossible to reconcile with the idea of efficiency being
the sole objective.  Third, the legislative history and political context of all the
enactments  render the efficiency-only  interpretation implausible.
Regardless of any ambiguity  in the statute itself or in its legislative history,
it  is  virtually  impossible  that  the Sherman  Act could have  been  crafted  with
only economic efficiency in mind.  At this time in history, legislators  gave little
attention  to what economists  had to say on such  issues.' 38  If economists  had
been consulted,  the legislature  would have known that the profession  at that
time was  generally hostile to  the very idea of antitrust  law.' 3 9  Perhaps  most
decisive,  economists of the day did not yet understand  economic efficiency  in
its  current  form.  In particular,  the most  straightforward  efficiency  argument
against  cartels  and  monopoly-the  one  the  Chicago  School  has  in  mind-
refers  not to efficiency  in production but rather to allocative efficiency, which
designates  the  welfare  loss  due  to  the  misallocation  of resources  resulting
from purchase decisions that are based upon super-competitive prices.  Yet, at
the  time of the  Sherman  Act's  passage,  this  aspect  of efficiency  was  making
only its first appearance  in economics literature,  and  it was not until decades
support  for  most  such  views  anywhere  in  the  legislative  history.  The  only  value  other  than
consumer welfare which  is even  suggested by the record  is protection of small businessmen, but,
as will  be argued,  that  value  was  given  only  a complementary  and not a  conflicting  role.  The
legislative  history,  in  fact,  contains  no  colorable support for  application  by  courts  of any  value
premise  or policy other  than the maximization  of consumer  welfare.  The legislators  did not, of
course, speak of consumer welfare with the precision  of a modern economist but their meaning was
unmistakable.
Id. at  10  (emphasis added)  (in interpreting  this  quotation, one should  keep  in mind that "consumer
welfare"  is  meant  to be  synonymous with  efficiency,  as  will be discussed  further below).
The positions  offered  by Richard  Posner and  Frank Easterbrook  on this score are more modest.
See  R.  POSNER  &  F.  EASTERBROOK,  supra note  3,  at  152-54.  Phillip  Areeda  and  Donald  Turner
advocate  that efficiency  be the sole objective of antitrust, see I  P.  AREEDA  & D. TURNER, supra note 58,
ch.  IB,  although  they make  their case largely on  grounds of practicality,  making only  brief note  of
the legislative history  for the purposes  of indicating that  it is  largely unilluminating, see id. $106.
138.  See,  e.g.,  R.  HOFSTADTER,  THE  PARANOID  STYLE  IN AMERICAN  POLITICS  AND OTHER  ESSAYS  200
(1965).
139.  See,  e.g.,  id.  at  200-02;  W.  LETWIN,  LAW  AND  ECONOMIC  POLICY  IN  AMERICA  71-77  (1965);
Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM.  L.  REV.  555,  577 (1973);  Rowe, supra note
16,  at  1516 n.24;  Rowe,  in Are Economists Taking Over,  supra note  100,  at 24  ("Antitrust revisionists
today  would  resurrect  Senator  Sherman  as  a  bearded  Milton  Friedman.  But  the  Darwinian
economists of 1890  would not touch  antitrust with  a ten-foot  pole.");  Stigler,  The Economists and the
Problem of Monopoly,  72  AM.  ECON.  REV.  1, 3  (1982)  (one  "would  have  searched long  and hard"  in
1890 to find  "any  economist  who  had ever  recommended"  such  a policy).LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
later that economists  generally came to understand and apply the concept. 140
It  is  thus inconceivable  that  members  of Congress  were  motivated  at  all by
such an argument-much  less solely motivated by it. 14  This is not to suggest
that efficiency  was irrelevant.  To the extent industrial combinations  might be
the  most efficient  means  of production, efficiency  considerations  constituted
an  argument  against antitrust  law,  or at least  against  excessive  application.
Although  such  concerns  can  be  found  in  the  legislative  debates,  they  can
hardly  be  read  as  constituting  the  sole  basis  favoring enactment  of  the
legislation.
142
The  statutory  language  of  antitrust  legislation  itself  poses  additional
problems  for  the  Chicago  School  positions.  If one  accepts  the arguments
advanced  by  some-that  cartelization  largely  subsumes  antitrust  concerns
from  an  efficiency  perspective1 43 -then  the  rest  of  the  antitrust  laws,
including  section  2  of the  Sherman  Act,  which  are  seen  as  conflicting  with
efficiency,  must necessarily  be explained  by  resort to  other objectives.' 4 4  In
addition, practices such as  tying and exclusive dealing are alleged generally  to
be efficient, although they are specifically targeted by section  3 of the Clayton
Act.  Mergers are considered unproblematic unless they raise cartelization  (or
perhaps  monopolization)  concerns  already  covered  by  the  Sherman  Act,
requiring  that  section  7  of the Clayton Act, which  was  subsequently  enacted
and amended  precisely to strengthen  the Sherman Act prohibitions,  be read
as  a  redundancy  that  can  safely  be  ignored.  Finally,  the  Robinson-Patman
Act, which  is  generally  viewed  as  most clearly contrary  to efficiency,  is  to be
disregarded,  perhaps  by  interpreting  it  (like  the  Clayton  Act)  in  such  a
manner  that  no  action  would  constitute  a  violation.' 45  Although  all  of the
140.  The  Sherman  Act  was  passed  at  the  beginning  of  1890.  Mike  Scherer  has  noted  that
Marshall's  first edition,  which  initially  brought  this  concept of deadweight  loss  to Anglo-American
economics,  did  not appear  until  1890,  with the  only earlier  references  being an "obscure  English-
language precursor"  originally published in  1871  and a variant that was published in French in  1844.
See Scherer, supra note 45,  at 977 & n.20; see also Lande, supra note  117, at 88  n.97.
141.  Robert  Bork and others make much  of references  in the debates to  higher prices  and lower
output, which are the twin effects of monopoly that result in a loss of allocative efficiency.  See, e.g.,  R.
BORK, supra note 3,  at 61-62;  Bork, supra note  137,  at  14-21.  To note those effects, however, is  a  far
cry  from  being  motivated  by  notions  of efficiency.  These  arguments  are  consistent  with  general
concerns  for consumers  or  small  business  purchasers,  including  concerns  for  the  distribution  of
income.  See,  e.g.,  Lande, supra note 117,  at 83-96  (suggesting that income distribution  was in fact the
original  and  primary  concern);  Scherer, supra note 45, at  979  ("Congress was  concerned  at least  as
much with income distribution effects (which were well-understood in  1890) as with efficiency  effects
(which were not).").  Thus, the reference to price and quantity  can be explained most persuasively in
a  manner  suggesting  that  efficiency  was  not  even  one  of  Congress'  concerns.  Regardless,  the
references  to many other purposes,  discussed  in the remainder of this  subsection, make it clear  that
efficiency  was  not the sole  objective.
142.  See,  e.g.,  Lande, supra note  117,  at 89-93.
143.  See,  e.g.,  R.  BORK,  supra note 3,  at  405-06  (also including  mergers  to  monopoly  and some
predation);  R.  POSNER,  supra note 3,  at  212-17.
144.  One argument sometimes  advanced  is  that efficiency  was the sole motivation for most or all
of the enactments,  but  that it was  misunderstood.  As  a result, one should follow the objectives  and
ignore,  or read  in a  manner to render  moot,  all  the conflicting  statutory  language, no matter  how
explicit.  An  example involving  the interpretation  of "competition"  in  the Clayton Act  is  discussed
below.
145.  See, e.g.,  Bork, supra note 50, at 9.  But see Breyer, supra note 50,  at 9 (disagreeing with Bork).
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proscriptions  in the  antitrust statutes are  at least  somewhat ambiguous-and
section  1 of the  Sherman  Act  is  the  height  of ambiguity,  unless  it  is  read
sufficiently literally as to prohibit virtually all contracting-they  are not wholly
without  content.  Moreover,  the  content  they  contain  is  often  inconsistent
with economic efficiency if one accepts the Chicago School's views concerning
what is  efficient.'
46
One particular  question  of interpretation  of the statutory  language-the
meaning  of  "competition"  in  many  of  the  antitrust  provisions-arises  in
numerous  contexts  and  has  been  the  focus  of  substantial  attention.  The
Chicago  School  position  is  that  competition  should  be  taken  to  mean
economic  efficiency,  rather  than some  notion of business  rivalry  that  would
include  the  preservation  of large  numbers of competitors  or entrepreneurial
freedom  as part of the  objective.1 47  A commonly  advanced  corollary  to  this
position  is  that  competitors  should  not  be  permitted  to  bring  antitrust
suits.148  This interpretation, of course, is directly opposed to the sort offered
in Brown  Shoe, discussed  previously.1
49
Robert  Bork,  who  perhaps  devotes  the  most  attention  to  the  issue,  has
recognized  that "competition"  has meanings  in regular usage  other than the
one  he  advocates.i 5 t  He  claims,  however,  that  various  reasons  justify  his
interpretation  and  that his  reading  "[s]urely  . . . is  consistent with  everyday
speech."i1I  Yet  because  most  who  speak  on  the  subject  do  not  even
understand  what  Bork  and  other  Chicago  School  adherents  mean  by
146.  Viewing  the  statutes  alone-ignoring  the  earlier  argument  concerning  when  allocative
efficiency first  came to  be understood,  problems with interpreting  "competition,"  and the legislative
history-one might be able to resurrect an efficiency-only position if one thought many practices  that
are the target  of the antitrust  laws were in  fact  inefficient.  See  also supra note  144.
147.  See, e.g.,  Roland Mach.  Co. v. Dresser Indus.,  Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984)  (Posner,
J.); University  Life Ins. Co. of Am.  v.  Unimarc Ltd.,  699 F.2d 846, 853  (7th Cir.  1983) (Posner, J.)  (in
referring to  the argument  that rivalry  is not an objective:  "That 'there's  a special providence  in  the
fall of a sparrow,'  Hamlet, Act  V, sc.  II,  line 232,  is not the contemporary philosophy of antitrust.");
Products  Liab.  Ins. Agency,  Inc.  v.  Crum  & Foster Ins.  Cos., 682  F.2d 660,  663-64  (7th  Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.); R.  BORK, supra note 3,  51,  58-61,  91  (the "whole  task of antitrust...  [is]  to improve...
efficiency"); Gerhart, supra note 2,  at 321,  330-31;  Fox, supra note  1, at 37 (discussing statements of
former  FTC  Chairman  Miller).  Frank Easterbrook  implicitly  takes  this  position  in  Easterbrook,  Is
There a Ratchet in  Antitrust Law?,  60  TEX.  L.  REV.  705,  714-15  (1982).  Although  this argument  is
usually reserved for the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman  Act, he also asserts that "the Sherman
Act  is  written  in  the  language  of 'competition,'  and  economic  terms,"  id.  at  714,  which  is  rather
surprising since the word  does not appear anywhere  in that enactment.
As  a  simple example,  this  interpretation  would  presumably  permit  a  merger  of all  firms  in  an
industry-thus  eliminating  all  competition-so  long  as  there  were  sufficient  economies  of scale,
despite  §  7's flat prohibition  on mergers  that "may  .. .substantially  .. .lessen  competition,  or...
tend to  create a monopoly."
148.  This position  is advanced  in  Easterbrook, supra note 62,  at 33-39, and expressed in many  of
Richard Posner's antitrust opinions.  See, e.g.,  Brunswick Corp. v.  Riegel  Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261,
266-67  (7th Cir.  1984),  cert. denied, 472 U.S.  1018  (1985);  cases  cited supra note  147.
149.  See supra at  202.
150.  See  R.  BORK,  supra note 3,  at  58  n.*.
151.  Id. at 61.  Quite striking  is  his  statement  that since the  models implicit  in  the Clayton Act
"are derived  from economics rather than-sociology  or political science, this usage would seem to rule
out all  but economic  goals."  Id. at 58.  Similar  pseudo-deduction  would,  for  example,  rule  out all
public  health  objectives  in  statutes  promoting  competition  in  the  health  sector  and  would  rule
economic  considerations  out of much defense  procurement  and many other areas.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
efficiency,  the notion that theirs is  one of the common uses of "competition"
is  problematic.  Although  hardly  decisive,  standard  dictionary  definitions  of
"competition"  offer as  a  synonym  "rivalry,"  the Chicago  School's  excluded
meaning,  and  all  the  definitions  offered  refer  to  the  rivalry  concept,  none
admitting  the  Chicago  School's  meaning.' 52  Not  only  does  the  Chicago
School economic interpretation directly contradict common usage, 153 it also is
inconsistent  with  the usage  of the term  by  economists,  who do mean rivalry
rather  than  economic  efficiency  when  they  refer  to  "competition."  The
standard  definitions  of perfect  competition  and  monopolistic  competition,
both of which stress rivalry,' 54 make this fact apparent.  Moreover, economists
have  no  reason  to  define  "competition"  as  "efficiency"  because  they  have
explicitly adopted separate terms for the two concepts.  Economic theorists go
about  proving  that  competition  produces  efficiency  in  some  circumstances
and  inefficiency  in  others;  the  language  by which  they  describe  their  efforts
clearly  reveals  that  they  use  "competition"  to  describe  the  process  of
interaction  (existence of rivalry,  specified in various  ways) and  "efficiency"  to
characterize  the  properties  of  the  result  of  many  processes,  of  which
competition  is  only  one.' 55  It  is  clear  that  "competition"  means  economic
efficiency  in the minds of a  few antitrust advocates  and no one else. 156
The efficiency-only  interpretation  also is  clearly contrary to the legislative
history of all the antitrust  statutes.  A  few highlights  from the rather  familiar
story should suffice.  The legislative  history of the Sherman Act-which  is the
only antitrust enactment  Chicago  School advocates  even attempt  to address
seriously' 57-reveals  countless  references  to nonefficiency  objectives.  These
152.  See,  e.g.,  WEBSTER'S  NEW  COLLEGIATE  DICTIONARY  230 (1977).
153.  By directly contradict, I mean  that, as  between  the two definitions under consideration, the
one the Chicago  School castigates is  precisely the one  implied by common usage and  the one they
advocate  has no connection whatsoever  to  common  usage.
154.  See,  e.g.,  E.  MANSFIELD,  MICROECONOMIcs  234-35,  302 (2d  ed.  1975).
155.  See,  e.g.,  T.  KooPMANS,  THREE  ESSAYS  ON  THE  STATE  OF  ECONOMIC  SCIENCE  1-126  (1957);  H.
VARIAN,  MICROECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  136-57  (1978).  One  can  also  compare  the  definitions  of
"competitive  markets,"  "monopolistic  competition,"  and  "perfect  competition"-all  defined  in
terms of large numbers of entities,  each of limited significance-and those of "allocative  efficiency"
and "pareto optimum"-defined in terms  of economic performance-in  D. PEARCE,  THE  DICTIONARY
OF  MODERN  ECONOMICS  14,  74-75,  292-93, 325,  329 (1981).  See also THE  McGRAw-HILL  DICTIONARY
OF  ECONOMICS  90-91  (D.  Greenwald,  et al.,  3d ed.  1983)  (defining "competition"  in terms of rivalry).
156.  Robert  Bork goes so far as to argue  that to the extent Congress meant  something other than
"what  we  usually  think  of as  competition"-i.e.,  if  Congress  meant  rivalry  and  not  efficiency-it
constitutes "a  fraud  upon the electorate."  Bork, supra note 50,  at 9  (emphasis  added).
Another problem  is  that  the  Chicago School  interpretation  of "competition,"  when  combined
with their view  that many  practices cited in  those sections of the antitrust laws  referring to injury to
competition are never anticompetitive in  the sense of impairing efficiency, essentially reads much  of
the  antitrust  prohibitions  out  of existence.  See  supra at  208-09;  Fox,  supra  note  77,  at  572-73.
Although this  is defended as  the only way to  make sense of the provisions, such a conflict would not
arise if "competition"  were read in a manner more in accord with common  usage and the legislative
history of the provisions.
157.  A striking example  is  in a recent  paper by Frank  Easterbrook,  who, in  response to Herbert
Hovenkamp's discussion of legislative history (which explicitly makes this point, see, e.g.,  Hovenkamp,
supra note  12,  at 249-50), only addresses  the Sherman  Act.  See  Easterbrook, supra note 44,  at  1702-
05.  In addition, one of his  main arguments is  that the efficiency-only approach differs  little from  a
broader  one, see id. at  1703, which makes one  wonder what to make of the large portion of Chicago
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references  are  consistent  with  all  theories  concerning  the  political  climate
surrounding  the  law's  enactment. 58   The  Robinson-Patman  Act,
implemented  during the New  Deal, was  explicitly  directed  toward protecting
small  business. 159  The very nature of the  strong economic  criticism  that this
Act  has  received  attests  to the fact that its  objectives are not solely  (if at all)
the  promotion  of economic  efficiency. 160  Another  clear  example,  the  1950
amendment  to section 7 of the Clayton Act,16 1 was expressly directed at social
and  political  aspects  of economic  concentration,  as  well  as the protection  of
small  business, rather  than at enhancing  economic  efficiency. 162  Thus,  even
relatively  more recent  congressional  action,  taken  after  modem  concepts  of
efficiency had become widely known, at least among economists,  unmistakably
School  argument  that  explicitly  criticizes  prior  decisions  and  commentary  for  admitting  other
objectives into  the analysis and  thereby producing bad results.
Much of Easterbrook's defense of the efficiency-only approach  makes  no attempt to  ground itself
in the statute or legislative history.  For example, he insists that a multiple objective approach is not
"sane",  id.  at  1703-04-a  position hardly consistent with  the  teachings  of economics.  Compare R.
BORK,  supra  note  3,  at  79-80  (rejecting  the  propriety  of  a  multiple  objective  approach),  with
Easterbrook, supra note 44, at  135  (criticizing the focus on one economic consideration when  others
are also  implicated).  Moreover, he  selects as  the single goal  the only one that could  not have  been
intended by Congress.
158.  See, e.g.,  R.  HOFSTADTER, supra note  138, at  199-200 ("Among the three [goals], the economic
[one]  was  the most cluttered  with uncertainties, so  much so  that  it  seems  to be  no exaggeration to
regard  antitrust  as  being  essentially  a  political  rather  than  an  economic  enterprise."  (footnote
omitted)), 205-11; H. THORELLI,  THE  FEDERAL  ANTITRUST  POLICY, ch. 4 (1955);  Fox, The Modernization
of Antitrust:  A  New  Equilibrium, 66  CORNELL L.  REV.  1140,  1147-48  (1981);  Lande, supra note  117,  at
82-106; Rowe,  supra note  16,  at  1513-17;  Stigler,  The  Origin of the Sherman Act,  14 J.  LEG.  STUD.  1
(1985)  (suggesting protection of small business  as a primary motivation).  Richard Hofstadter traces
some of the changes in views  concerning antitrust, business, and the economy since that time, see R.
HOFSTADTER,  supra  note  138,  at  212-28,  although  the  most  recent  major  substantive  antitrust
legislation,  the  1950 amendment  to Clayton  Act  § 7,  evidences  that similar motivations  to those  at
the time of the Sherman Act were  clearly central.
159.  See,  e.g., Jefferson County Pharm.  Ass'n,  Inc. v. Abbott  Laboratories, 460  U.S.  150,  170-71
(1983);  R.  HOFSTADTER,  supra note  138,  at 221; Hansen,  Robinson-Patman  Law:  A  Review and Analysis,
51  FORDHAM  L. REV.  1113  (1983);  Rowe, supra note  16, at  1519 (quoting Rep. Patman  advocating a
"policy  of live and  let live."  "protect[ing]  the weak  against  the strong and  prevent[ing]  men  from
injuring one another,"  80  CONG.  REC.  3447  (1936)).
160.  See, e.g.,  R. BORK,  supra note 3,  at 382-401  ("antitrust's least glorious hour"); F.M.  SCHERER,
supra note 67,  at 580-82  (questioning whether beneficiaries include any except attorneys involved in
litigation concerning  application of the  provision).
161.  The  original  Clayton  Act  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act,  both passed  in  1914,
reflected objectives similar to those involved in enactment of the Sherman Act-objectives other than
economic efficiency.  See,  e.g.,  Lande, supra note  117,  at  106-30.
162.  See,  e.g.,  Brown Shoe, 370 U.S.  at 311-23; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74  HARV.  L. REV.  226, 233-38 (1960);  Cann, Section  7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit  of
Economic "Objectivity ".  Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy  ?, 60 NOTRE  DAME  L.
REV.  273,  277-84  (1985);  Fox, supra note  158, at  1149-51;  Lande, supra note  117,  at  130-42;  Rowe,
supra note  16, at  1523-24.  Derek Bok's  statement provides a good  summary of the legislative history
as  it relates to the issue of objectives:
To  anyone  used  to  the  preoccupation  of  professors  and  administrators  with  the  economic
consequences of monopoly  power, the  curious aspect of the debates  is  the paucity of remarks
having to do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.
To  be  sure,  there  were  allusions  to  the  need  for  preserving  competition.  But  competition
appeared to  possess  a  strong socio-political connotation which  centered  on  the virtues  of the
small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated  in economic  literature.
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reflects  motivations  other  than,  and  sometimes  in  opposition  to,  economic
efficiency. 1 63
Thus,  it is not merely eight decades of "aberrant"  court opinions but also
a  clear  indication  in  both  the  statutes  and  their  legislative  history  that
supports the proposition that economic efficiency  does not constitute  the sole
objective of the antitrust laws.'1 64  It thus  is  hardly  surprising that some  who
hold views  close  to those of the Chicago School have called for the repeal  or
substantial  modification  of significant  portions  of the  antitrust  statutes.'
65
The entire history is sufficiently uncertain and vague that no particular pattern
of antitrust doctrine can be defended  against all  others as a  simple matter of
fidelity  to  Congress.  Furthermore,  notions  of economic  efficiency  surely
constitute  an  important  component  of  any  sensible  interpretation  of  the
antitrust statutes.  For the courts to proclaim efficiency as the sole objective  of
antitrust,  however,  would  constitute  a  substantial  political  act  indeed,  and
precisely  the sort  that would be  condemned  by those who generally  counsel
judicial restraint and defend the judicial role as being distinct from that of the
legislature.
2.  Efficiency of the Common Law versus Inefficiency of Antitrust Law.  Until now,
most  of the  discussion  of the new  law  and economics  of antitrust  has  been
presented without consideration  of the  more recent  and wider  movement  in
law and economics, 166 significant elements of which are particularly associated
with  a  "Chicago  School."  Juxtaposing  developments  in  both  areas  is
illuminating, especially since the central tenets of the two Chicago Schools are
in  conflict.  This  conflict  arises  from  the  major  proposition  of the  Chicago
School of law and  economics  that the common law is efficient' 67-in  contrast
163.  Interestingly, economists and  other scholars interested in  and informed about the antitrust
laws have  interpreted  the legislation  in  political  and  social  terms  rather  than as focused  primarily,
much less exclusively,  on economic  efficiency.  See  R.  HOFSTADTER,  supra note  138,  at 233.
Frederick  Rowe develops  the argument  that economic  concentration,  broadly construed,  rather
than economists'  concepts  of market power and efficiency, were historially at the core of the antitrust
enactments,  and  the  economic  approach  did  not  emerge  until  it  was  employed  as  part  of an
aggressive  litigation  strategy  in  the  1940's aimed  at making  it easier,  rather than more  difficult,  to
find antitrust  liability.  See Rowe,  supra note  16,  at  1521-22,  1524,  1529-32,  1560-61.
164.  Interestingly,  Richard  Posner  cites  the  Sherman  Act  as  one  of  the  statutes  he  would
characterize,  like  some  constitutional  provisions,  as  used  by  courts  more  as  pretexts  for  their
decisions,  wherein  the  language  is never explicitly  referenced  and  the case law  is  used  as  both  the
beginning and end of the inquiry.  See R.  POSNER, supra note 60, at 278.  He similarly suggests that the
common  law  nature of the  antitrust statutes,  see  infra subsection  IV-B-2,  may  free  the judge  from
having to consult the legislators'  values  at all.  See,  R.  POSNER, supra note 60,  at 288.  Of course,  as
demonstrated  in  section A of this part, Posner would have  to  free himself of the case law,  as  well as
the  statutes  and  their  legislative  history,  in order  to leave  sufficient  room for  him  to advance  the
efficiency-only  approach  toward  antitrust.
165.  See, e.g.,  R.  POSNER, supra note 3,  at 7, 212-17.  Recent Reagan Administration  proposals and
statements  by particular officials could also  be noted.
166.  The use of economics  in  antitrust has been  explicitly distinguished  from  the new  law  and
economics  more generally.  See supra at  184.
167.  See,  e.g.,  R.  POSNER, supra note  3; Posner, Some  Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.  CHI.
L. REV.  281,  287-97  (1979).  "[Tlhese  problems  [with  the economic  theory  of the common  law] do
not include  the alleged  inadequacy  of "efficiency"  . .. as  a normative criterion.  The positive  theory
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to  claims  that  it  should  be  efficient  or  that  economic  analysis  is  useful  in
predicting  the effects of common  law rules. 168
Antitrust  law may not appear to  fit within  this framework,  but the conflict
appears  once  one  recognizes  that  antitrust  has  long  been  viewed  in  many
respects  as a  common  law  subject-in light of its  common  law origins  in the
law  of restraint  of trade  and  its  development  for nearly  a  century  by  courts
faced with the task of interpreting many rather open-ended  enactments.1 6 9  In
fact,  Congress  apparently  contemplated  a common  law  type  of development
when  it  enacted  the Sherman  Act.' 70  In  his  recent  book  on  federal  courts,
Richard  Posner notes the tension that  results from  this recognition:
But  at another  level  the inclusion  of antitrust  [as  a "quasi"  common  law  field]  may
seem  simply  to  demonstrate  the  fatuity  of  my  enterprise  of  associating  federal
common  law  with  economic  efficiency.  For  is  it  not  the  teaching  of an  extensive
literature-to  which  I,  among  many  others,  have  contributed-that  the  courts,  in
interpreting  the antitrust  statutes,  have  misused  economic  principles  to  produce  a
body of doctrine fairly riddled with  economic fallacies?171
In  fairness,  Posner  explicitly  limits  himself  to  a  brief  discussion  of  this
question, 17 2   but  given  the  potential  importance  of  this  fundamental
contradiction  in  two  extensively  developed  lines  of work,  his  attempted
resolution is  worth considering.
The primary argument he offers for distinguishing antitrust is that, during
the Warren  Court, 173  the  government  brought  a  large portion  of the cases
and was  permitted direct  appeal  to  the Supreme  Court, with  the  result  that
says only that the common law appears  to be  an engine of wealth maximization, not that it should be
one."  Id. at 291  (emphasis in  original).
168.  More  recently,  Richard  Posner's  writings  have  devoted  considerable  attention  to  the
proposition that efficiency (wealth maximization) should be the objective of the common  law.  See, e.g.,
Posner, The  Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency  Norm  in Common Law Adjudication, 8  HOFSTRA  L.
REV.  487  (1980);  Posner, Utilitarianism,  Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEG.  STUD.  103  (1979).  This
claim  has  been  subject  to  extensive  debate.  See,  e.g.,  Symposium  on  Efficiency  as  a Legal Concern,  8
HOFsTRA L.  REV.  485  (1980);  Dworkin,  Is  Wealth  a Value?,  9 J.  LEG.  STUD.  191  (1980);  Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9J. LEG.  STUD.  227 (1980).  There  is no  doubt, however,
that Posner  continues  to maintain  his descriptive claim  independently.
Many  law and economics scholars  not associated with  the Chicago  School have devoted most of
their attention neither to whether the common law is efficient nor to whether it should be, but rather
to predicting the effects of common  law rules and determining which are efficient and which are not.
See,  e.g.,  A. POLINSKY,  AN  INTRODUCTION To  LAW  AND ECONOMICS (1983);  Shavell, Strict Liability versus
Negligence, 9J. LEG.  STUD.  1 (1980).
169.  See, e.g.,  National  Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.  United States, 435  U.S. 679, 688  (1978);  II
P.  AREEDA  &  D.  TURNER,  supra note  58,  ch.  3A;  R.  POSNER,  supra note  60,  at  288,  301;  Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial  Discretion, and the  "Common  Law"  Nature of Antitrust Law,  60  TEx.  L.
REV.  661,  662-73  (1982);  Easterbrook, supra note  147,  at 706 &  n.5; Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation
and the Power of the Judiciary, 7  HARV.  J.L. &  PUB.  POL.  87, 93  (1984).
170.  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Associated  Press, 52  F. Supp.  362,  370 (S.D.N.Y.  1943)  (Hand, J.)
("Congress  has incorporated into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards of the common law"),
aff'd, 326 U.S.  1 (1945);  II  P.  AREEDA  & D.  TURNER,  supra  note  58,  302.
171.  R.  POSNER,  supra note 60,  at  301.
172.  See id.
173.  Posner's  focus  on  the  Warren  Court  might  suggest  that  the  rejection of the  efficiency
approach  was  an  aberration  of that  era,  contrary  to  the  clear  indications  in  section  IV-A.  For
example, Learned  Hand's  prounouncements  in Alcoa,  see supra at  201,  as  well  as  his discussion  of
monopolization, preceded  and  were accepted  by the  Supreme  Court  well  before  that  time period.
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only  a  handful  of judges  were  determining  antitrust  doctrine. 174  Posner
claims  that  a  "[p]olicy  so  determined  is  unlikely  to be very  stable." 175  The
question, however,  is why  such an approach  would interfere  with the general
efficiency  properties  of the common  law.  All federal  common  law is  largely
determined ultimately by the Supreme  Court.  Although  in other areas there
may have been appellate court opinions to lend assistance, it is difficult to see
how the lack of an intermediate opinion would fundamentally  alter either the
quality  and  consistency  of Supreme  Court  opinions  or  the basic  objectives
that were pursued.  The persuasiveness  of a distinction on this ground is even
more dubious  in light  of the fact that many of the district court opinions are
famous  for their  care  (and length),  and  a  number were  crafted  by  the  most
respected  federal  judges  of their  time.  In  addition,  despite  the  fact  that
antitrust law may shift over  generations  more rapidly than does the  common
law, 176  section  IV-A  demonstrated  that one result  has  been largely  constant
for nearly  a  century:  The  courts  have been  guided  by  objectives  other than
efficiency.  Moreover, in the past decade, where direct appeal to the Supreme
Court  was  no longer  available,  the alleged movement  toward  efficiency  that
Posner applauds  is attributed  to Supreme  Court  decisions,  and not traced in
any  way to lower  courts.' 77  Thus, to  the extent  there  has been  a  substantial
move in the efficiency  direction,  it seems rather difficult  to  attribute it to this
procedural change rather  than, for example,  to more general  currents  in the
Supreme  Court over the past fifteen  years.
There  exists,  of  course,  another  rather  direct  way  to  resolve  this
contradiction.  One  could  argue  that  antitrust  is  not  really  a  common  law
174.  See  R.  POSNER,  supra note 60, at  302.
175.  Id.  In claiming  that the Court has  since played  a smaller role,  having "relatively  infrequent
occasions  when it decides antitrust cases these days,"  id. at 302-03,  one would infer that the number
of antitrust  opinions  rendered  each  year  by  the  Supreme Court  had  substantially  decreased,  but
examination  of statistics  appearing in  the Harvard Law Review  that summarize  the Supreme Court's
docket each Term over the past few decades  and direct computer searches  reveal that the decline,  if
any,  is insubstantial.  (The mean may have fallen from approximately five  full opinions per Term to
slightly over four,  and  the variance is  less.)  A  recent  compilation shows  that the  large decrease  in
government-initiated  cases  is  significantly offset  by the  increase  in  private antitrust  cases,  and  that
there was  little decline from the early Burger Court (over half the cases  arising when the expediting
act was  in effect) to the later Burger Court.  See Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court:  A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60  NOTRE  DAME  L. REV.  947, 1051-52  (1985).  Moreover,  it is not clear why it would be that
having a smaller  group  of cases  in  a  given  time  period facilitates  development  of the common  law
either in a more orderly fashion or in  an efficiency  direction.
176.  Given  recent developments  in  products liability  law,  landlord-tenant  law,  and  other  areas,
this assumption  is  hardly obvious.  It  is  offered in  the text merely  for the sake of argument.
177.  Some of the more important of these decisions  applauded  by  the Chicago School involved
reversals  of the lower courts.  See, e.g.,  Jefferson Parish  Hosp. Dist. No.  2 v. Hyde, 66  U.S.  2  (1984);
Reiter v.  Sonotone  Corp.,  442  U.S.  330  (1979);  Broadcast  Music,  Inc.  v. CBS, 441  U.S.  1 (1979);
United States  Steel Corp.  v.  Fortner  Enters.,  Inc.,  429  U.S.  610  (1977).  In  addition,  Sylvania was
applauded for overruling Schwinn,  but this  was  not the basis for the decision  in the appellate  court,
Continental  T.V.,  Inc.  v.  GTE  Sylvania  Inc.,  433  U.S.  36  (1977).  General Dynamics, which  is  often
regarded  as  heralding  the new  era, was  a  direct appeal  under  the  expediting  act,  United States  v.
General Dynamics Corp.,  415 U.S.  486  (1974).  Of course,  with  the recent judicial appointments  of
appellate court judges associated  with an economic  approach, and  in particular that of the Chicago
School,  the Supreme  Court  can  expect  in  the  future  to have  ever  more  guidance  from  appellate
courts to educate  them in an  efficiency  direction.
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subject  after  all  because  the  statutes,  as  explained  in  subsection  IV-B-l,
simply  give  too  much  of  a  directive  to  take  an  approach  other  than  one
focused  exclusively  on  economic  efficiency.  As  to  the  antitrust  enactments
after the Sherman Act, Posner does offer this point as a partial explanation.  78
Once  this  out  is  taken,  however,  the  argument  comes  full  circle:  If  the
resolution  of the apparent  contradiction  requires the claim that  the antitrust
laws  preclude  the  efficiency  approach,  then  the  activism  that  would  be
involved  in interpreting them as advocated  by the Chicago  School of antitrust
becomes  all  the more clear.179
V
CONCLUSION
Important  changes  in  antitrust  law  have  occurred  over  the  past  fifteen
years.  The thesis of this article is that this shift has been misunderstood-not
as  to  the  content  of  the  newly  evolved  doctrine,  but  rather  as  to  the
explanation  for  the  change.  The  Introduction  suggested  that  these
developments  are  more plausibly  understood  in the context of broader, and
in  many  respects  parallel,  shifts  in  all  the  Supreme  Court's decisions.  The
preceding  discussion  supports  this  conclusion.  As  part  II demonstrated,  it
simply  is  not  the  case  that  economic  analysis  is  used  substantially  more
frequently  in  examining  economic  issues.  Part  III  indicated  that, although
economic  analysis  has  changed  substantially  in  the  past  five  decades,  the
Chicago  School of antitrust and  many of the doctrinal  shifts by  the Supreme
Court  are  hardly  necessary  outcomes  of such  a  change.  Finally,  part  IV
indicated how changes  in the purported objectives of antitrust in the direction
of considering  only economic  efficiency  have  been overstated.  Moreover,  to
the  extent these changes  have occurred  or will  occur  in the future,  they  are
best  understood  as  an  activist  recreation  of antitrust  rather  than  as  any
attempt  to return to  the statutes  or their original  meaning.' 80
Overall,  recent  changes  in  antitrust-actual  or  advocated-are  in  large
respect a function of politics, even though the position advocated is defined  in
178.  See  R.  POSNER,  supra note 60,  at 302.
179.  Another  tension  between  these two areas arises  from Posner's advocacy  of the efficiency  of
common  law  characterization  based  primarily  on  his  interpretation  of observed  evidence  (court
decisions),  even in the absence of a compelling theoretical  basis for this alignment.  See, e.g.,  Samuels
& Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench,  4 Irr'L REV.  L.  ECON.  107,  108  (1984).  Yet it is
precisely  such an approach by those using case studies  to explore industrial organization that Posner
has  criticized.  See  supra at  189.
180.  In an early  survey of the Burger Court's  antitrust jurisprudence, Posner explicitly advanced
the  position  that the Court's  primary  difference  from  the Warren  Court  was  its  less  activist,  more
restrained  approach.  See Posner,  The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47 ANrrrrlusT L.J.  819, 821-
25  (1978).  The primary  reasons  offered  for this conclusion  were  the narrow  grounds  for decision
offered  (noting the exception of Sylvania, and not describing instances of Warren Court activism) and
greater  "deference  to district  court fact findings  in the defendant's  favor."  Id. at 822.  If the Burger
Court  has in fact made little change in antitrust doctrine,  it could hardly be characterized  as activist.
But the changes  attributed  to it by many are contrary to such a reading,  in which case section  IV-B's
analysis  indicates  the appropriateness  of an activist  characterization.LAW  AND  CONTEMPORARY  PROBLEMS
terms of economics.  In this respect, antitrust resembles  constitutional law.' 8'
Of course,  when  shifts  in  Supreme  Court  doctrine arise,  one should not  be
surprised to observe the Court referring to academic literature supporting the
results in order to lend further credibility to its opinions, 8 2 just as the Warren
Court  used  economics  and  cited  relevant  literature  in  support  of  its
opinions. 183
One direct ramification  of characterizing  the Chicago  School approach  as
activist  is  that  the  appointment  of Chicago  School  advocates  to  the  bench
would  appear  inconsistent  with  the  stated  policy  of  the  national
administration against judicial activism and in opposition to any appointments
who might not share this view.'8 4  It is not only that Chicago School adherents
advocate  the  reversal  of  long-standing  precedents,  such  as  Dr.  Miles'
prohibition of resale price maintenance, 8 5 but that its position is substantially
at odds with  congressional enactments over almost a century.  Of course, this
contradiction  between  opposition  to activism  and  the  desire  to reshape  the
antitrust laws  would  be  unimportant  if, as  is  frequently  suggested,  rhetoric
concerning judicial  activism  and fidelity  to Congress  is  reserved  for areas  in
which one favors or opposes particular results.  If one is  to take any cues from
antitrust,  the  best  explanation  for  the  appointment  of  federal  judges
associated with the law and economics of the Chicago School is not a desire  to
improve  the  economic  sophistication  of the federal  judiciary  but  rather  an
attempt  to  further the effort  to have the composition  of the judiciary  reflect
particular  political  views.' 8 6  Thus,  the  title  of this  conference-Economists
on  the  Bench-and  of this  session-Impact  of Economically  Sophisticated
Judges  on  Economically  Sensitive  Areas  of the  Law-convey  a  misleading
impression  of what  these recent  events have  been about.
181.  It is relevant that in both areas,  as well as  in most others, Burger Court changes generally do
not  reflect changes  in  the  opinions of the same Justices  over  time,  but  rather the  fact that  recent
appointees decide cases differently than those replaced.  Major doctrinal changes in antitrust history
have similarly  reflected changing personnel.  See,  e.g.,  Standard Oil Co.  v.  United States,  221  U.S.  1
(1911)  (both Justices  remaining  from earlier, anti-rule-of-reason cases retained  same position).
182.  See supra note 7.  Eleanor Fox has noted how the Chicago School economic approach may be
a politically congenial source of support given contemporary mixes of political forces.  See Fox, supra
note  77,  at 588.
183.  See supra part Ii.
184.  Not  surprisingly,  recent  Chicago  School appointees,  like  most,  claim  to  be  opposed  to
judicial activism.  See,  e.g.,  Bork, Emerging Substantive Standards-Developments and Need for Change, 50
ANTITRUST  L.J.  179,  180  (1982)  (criticizing alleged activism  of Warren  Court  antitrust  decisions);
Easterbrook,  supra note  169.
185.  Dr.  Miles Medical  Co.  v. John  D.  Park &  Sons.  Co.,  220  U.S.  373  (1911).  The effect of a
potential  reversal  is  heightened by Congress'  recent repeal  of the  1930's statute that overrode the
prohibition under certain  circumstances.  See,  e.g.,  Continental T.V.,  Inc. v.  GTE Sylvania  Inc.,  433
U.S.  36,  51  n.18  (1977).
186.  The Administration's  1987 nominations  of Supreme  Court Justices  bear this out.  Eleanor
Fox's  conclusion concerning former FTC  Chairman Miller provides  a useful contrast.  See Fox, supra
note  1, at 54-55.
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